American University Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 2

Article 3

2008

Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children:
Following Switzerland's Example in Hague
Abduction Cases
Merle H. Weiner
University of Oregon School of Law, mweiner@uoregon.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Weiner, Merle H. “Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following Switzerland's Example in Hague Abduction Cases.”
American University Law Review 58, no. 2 (December 2008): 335-403.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following Switzerland's
Example in Hague Abduction Cases
Abstract

In the twilight days of 2007, Switzerland took decisive action to protect children who were being harmed by
the application of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Hague
Abduction Convention" or "Convention"). 1 Its Parliament passed the Federal Act on International Child
Abduction and the Hague Conventions on the Protection of Children and Adults ("Swiss Act"). 2 The Swiss
Act, which should enter into force in mid-2009, 3 gives important and necessary guidance to Swiss courts
about the phrase "intolerable situation" in Article 13(b) of the Hague Abduction Convention. 4 The Swiss Act
also directs courts to appoint representatives for children in Hague child abduction proceedings. 5 The United
States should follow Switzerland's example and adopt similar reforms. The United States need not pass
legislation to do so, but rather U.S. courts should follow Switzerland's lead as the opportunities arise in
individual cases.
This Article describes the Swiss law and the context for its adoption and then examines the doctrinal and
practical significance of its provisions. A few recent U.S. cases are used to illustrate the need for courts in the
United States to follow Switzerland's example. For example, the Swiss interpretation of "intolerable situation"
might have changed the 2007 decisions of the federal district court in Adan v. Avans. 6 The Swiss approach to
appointing counsel for children in Hague child abduction proceedings might also have altered the outcome of
a 2008 federal district court decision, Mendez-Lynch v. Pizzutello. After considering potential drawbacks to
the Swiss reforms, the Article concludes that the U.S. courts have little to lose, and much to gain by
incorporating these Swiss ideas into the adjudication of Hague cases.
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INTRODUCTION
In the twilight days of 2007, Switzerland took decisive action to
protect children who were being harmed by the application of the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
1
Abduction (“Hague Abduction Convention” or “Convention”). Its
Parliament passed the Federal Act on International Child Abduction
and the Hague Conventions on the Protection of Children and
2
Adults (“Swiss Act”). The Swiss Act, which should enter into force in
3
mid-2009, gives important and necessary guidance to Swiss courts
about the phrase “intolerable situation” in Article 13(b) of the Hague
4
Abduction Convention. The Swiss Act also directs courts to appoint
5
representatives for children in Hague child abduction proceedings.
The United States should follow Switzerland’s example and adopt
similar reforms. The United States need not pass legislation to do so,
but rather U.S. courts should follow Switzerland’s lead as the
opportunities arise in individual cases.
This Article describes the Swiss law and the context for its adoption
and then examines the doctrinal and practical significance of its
provisions. A few recent U.S. cases are used to illustrate the need for
courts in the United States to follow Switzerland’s example. For

1. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, art. 13(b),
Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Hague Abduction
Convention], available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&
cid=24.
2. Loi fédérale sur l’enlèvement international d’enfants et les Conventions de
La Haye sur la protection des enfants et des adultes [LF-EEA] [Federal Act on
International Child Abduction and the Hague Conventions on the Protection of
Children and of Adults], Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 34 (2008)
[hereinafter Swiss Federal Act], available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/
2008/33.pdf, translated in Andreas Bucher, The New Swiss Federal Act on International
Child Abduction, 4 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 139, 161–65 (2008).
3. At the time of publication, the Federal Council had not yet set the date for
the Act’s entry into force, although it appears as if July 1, 2009 is the target date.
E-mail from Andreas Bucher to Merle Weiner, Oct. 30, 2008 (on file with author).
4. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 13(b).
5. Id.
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example, the Swiss interpretation of “intolerable situation” might
have changed the 2007 decisions of the federal district court in Adan
6
v. Avans. The Swiss approach to appointing counsel for children in
Hague child abduction proceedings might also have altered the
outcome of a 2008 federal district court decision, Mendez-Lynch v.
7
After considering potential drawbacks to the Swiss
Pizzutello.
reforms, the Article concludes that U.S. courts have little to lose, and
much to gain, by incorporating these Swiss ideas into the
adjudication of Hague cases.
I.

THE SWISS LAW

The Swiss law guides Swiss courts in their application of the Hague
8
Abduction Convention, a treaty that applies to the transnational
abduction of children primarily by their parents. The Convention
requires contracting states to return an abducted child quickly to the
9
child’s country of habitual residence, in most circumstances. The
Convention contains several exceptions to its remedy of return, two
of which are particularly relevant to the Swiss reform. Article 13(b)
provides that a court need not return a child if the return would pose
“a grave risk that . . . return . . . would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
10
Another portion of Article 13 makes the child’s own
situation.”
opinion relevant to the court’s obligation to return the child: “The
judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the
return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned
6. Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711 (D.N.J. July 30, 2007),
rev’d, In re Adan, 554 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008); Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW),
2007 WL 1850910 (D.N.J. June 25, 2007), rev’d, In re Adan, 554 F.3d 542 (3d Cir.
2008).
The Adan v. Avans case came before the district court once in 2006 and twice in
2007. The case went up on appeal twice. The Adan v. Avans case was appealed to
the Third Circuit in 2006 following the district court’s one-sentence order to return
the child, and the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the
case. In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2006). On remand, the district court again
ordered the child’s return. Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 1850910
(D.N.J. June 25, 2007). A month later, the district court rejected motions for
reconsideration and a stay while the case was appealed to the Third Circuit. Adan v.
Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711 (D.N.J. July 30, 2007). On appeal,
both of the district court’s 2007 decisions were reversed, and the Third Circuit
dismissed the Hague Convention petition. In re Adan, 544 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008).
The text will discuss all of these decisions, but it is the 2007 trial court decisions that
are the most illuminating for purposes of this Article.
7. Mendez-Lynch v. Pizzutello, No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 WL 416934 (N.D.
Ga. Feb. 13, 2008).
8. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1.
9. Id. art 12.
10. Id. art. 13(b).
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and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is
11
appropriate to take account of its views.”
Reformers in Switzerland became concerned about the application
of the Hague Abduction Convention, and these defenses in
particular, after they observed the child custody case of Russell Wood
12
and Maya Wood-Hosig (“the Wood case”). In the Wood case, the
13
mother took her two children from Australia to Switzerland. When
she was discovered in Switzerland, her children were forcibly
removed from her and institutionalized for a year until they could be
14
returned to Australia. When the time finally came for the children
15
to travel to Australia, the children had to be forced onto the plane.
Upon arrival in Australia, the children were again placed in foster
care. The father was unable to care for the children, so the children
16
could not be returned to him.
The mother did not return to
Australia because she faced a criminal action there for the
17
abduction. Because it took some time for the Australian court to
issue a custody decision, the children experienced several Australian
18
Eventually, the Australian court gave the mother
foster homes.
19
custody and allowed the children to return to Switzerland. In short,
the children ended up with exactly the same arrangement as before
the Hague proceeding began; yet, they were forced to endure
enormous distress and hardship as the process played out.

11. Id. art. 13.
12. Parliament of Western Australia, Legislative Assembly-Grievance, Russell
Wood & Maya Wood-Hosig, Aug. 24, 2006 (Mr. Dan Barron-Sullivan & Mr. David
Templeman), available at http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/web/newwebparl.nsf/
iframewebpages/Hansard+-+Advanced+Search (search “Search For” for “Wood” and
“Date on” for “24/08/2006”) [hereinafter Legislative Assembly-Grievance]; Bucher,
supra note 2, at 139.
13. Legislative Assembly-Grievance, supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. Bucher, supra note 2, at 139.
16. Id. at 139–40.
17. Id. at 139.
18. Legislative Assembly-Grievance, supra note 12.
19. Id. Although the father lodged an appeal, the trial judge allowed the
children to return to Switzerland pending resolution of the appeal. Id. This was
important for the mother’s case because an Australian law said that the judge does
not have to return the child if the child lives in Australia for two years. If the
proceedings had taken another six months, this benchmark would have been
reached. Id.; see also Notes of Proceedings for the Fifth Meeting of the Special
Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction and the First to Review the Practical
Implementation of the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law,
Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility
and Measures for the Protection of Children, Nov. 6 (comments of Professor
Andreas Bucher) (on file with author) [hereinafter Notes of Proceedings].
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To address the problems made manifest by the Wood case,
delegates from Switzerland proposed to the international community
that a new provision be added to the Convention that would
20
At the Fifth Meeting of the Special
supplement Article 13(b).
Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention, held
in 2006, the Swiss delegation introduced Working Document No. 2.
Article 7 of that document, entitled “Return and best interest of the
child,” would allow a court to refuse to return a child if the following
criteria were met:
(1) the placement with the applicant is manifestly not in the best
interest of the child, (2) the [abducting parent] cannot care for
the child in the child’s habitual residence (or cannot reasonably be
required to do so), and (3) the placement in foster care is
21
manifestly not in the best interest of the child.

Despite vigorous advocacy by the Swiss, the proposal was rejected:
“A clear majority of experts indicated that the Swiss proposal to
amend the Convention, while raising important and timely issues for
22
debate, should not be accepted.”
The Swiss proposal probably failed because of the language used to
frame the new provision. By describing the amendment as an
23
application of the “best interest” principle, as its title suggested, the
20. Switzerland proposed these changes because of “[s]everal distressing cases”
that occurred in Switzerland. Special Comm’n on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child
Abduction, Working Doc. No. 1E, at 3 (2006) [hereinafter Working Doc. No. 1E]; see
also Bucher, supra note 2, at 139–42 (describing the specific cases that Switzerland
found distressing).
21. Special Comm’n on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, Working Doc.
No. 2E, art. 7 (2006) [hereinafter Working Doc. No. 2E]. This was a refinement of
Switzerland’s initial proposal, found in item 5 of Working Document 1. See Working
Doc. No. 1E, supra note 20, item 5.
22. Hague Conference on Private International Law, October 30–November 9,
2006, Report on the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the
Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
and the Practical Implementation of the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, at 45, ¶ 163 (Mar. 2007)
[hereinafter Report on the Fifth Meeting].
23. The Swiss argued that this change was timely, given the worldwide adoption
of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and “of the prominence given to
the overriding interests of the child in everything that concerns it.” Working Doc.
No. 1E, supra note 20, at Remarks: Point 5. Article 3(1) of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child states: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.” Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex art.
3(1), U.N. Doc.A/Res/44/25 (Dec. 12, 1989), available at http://www.cirp.org/
library/ethics/UN-convention. The Swiss also identified the issue that was to be
addressed as follows: “Amending Art. 13, clause (b) so as to clarify the relationship
between the principle of returning the abducted child and the interests of the child.”
Working Doc. 1E, supra note 20, at Point 5.
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provision looked as if it were the first step to a broader defense that
would potentially excuse return whenever the best interest of the
24
child required it. In fact, the Swiss believe that decisions from the
European Court of Human Rights require consideration of the
25
child’s best interest in all cases. The United States opposed the
proposal, noting that the best interest of the child is typically
26
achieved by returning the child.
Although Working Document No. 2 was not adopted, Switzerland
is to be commended for bringing the Wood case and other
problematic fact patterns to the world’s attention. The Swiss
demonstrated that the Hague Convention defenses are interpreted
too narrowly in various scenarios, resulting in harsh outcomes for the
children involved. These scenarios typically involve abductions by
27
primary caretakers. Some of these abductions occur in order for the
28
abductor to escape family violence, and courts sometimes return the
child even though the primary custodian cannot safely return with
29
30
the child. Some of these children end up in foster care or with the
24. See Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra note 22, at 46, ¶ 165 (noting that “[a]
majority of experts . . . cautioned that the Swiss proposal created an additional
ground for refusal, which would undermine the principle of comity by inviting courts
in requested States to examine the best interests of the child”).
25. Bucher, supra note 2, at 156–57 & n.32.
26. Notes of Proceedings, supra note 19.
27. Merle H. Weiner, Half-Truths, Mistakes, and Embarrassments: The United States
Goes to the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 221,
222–23 (2008) (indicating that 68% of the taking persons were primary or joint
caregivers (citing A Statistical Analysis of Applications Made in 2003 Under the Hague
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, infra note 247, at
21–23)).
28. Id.
29. Courts have not yet embraced the idea that Article 20 of the Convention
affords a defense to return in these cases either. I have argued elsewhere that it is a
violation of Article 20 to make a domestic violence victim litigate custody in a venue
where her safety is at risk. See Merle H. Weiner, Strengthening Article 20, 38 U.S.F. L.
REV. 701, 702 (2004) (arguing that Article 20 should be strengthened to allow the
Hague Convention to operate more justly for domestic violence victims who flee
transnationally with their children to escape domestic violence); Merle H. Weiner,
Using Article 20, 38 FAM. L.Q. 583, 583–84 (2004) (detailing the aspects of an Article
20 defense that a domestic violence victim might make when responding to a Hague
petition in the United States). Article 20 permits an assessment of whether return
violates the human rights of any individual. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra
note 1, art. 20 (“The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be
refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the
requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.”).
30. See, e.g., Adan v. Avans, No. 04-55155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711, at *4
(D.N.J. July 30, 2007) (arranging with Argentinean authorities for the child to enter
foster care; case involved allegations of domestic violence and child sexual abuse),
rev’d, In re Adan, 544 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008); In re L.L., (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 22, 2000)
reported at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0273.htm (holding that an Article
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petitioner (the alleged abuser). In other cases, serious and credible
child abuse allegations are made against the left-behind parent, but
the court in the abducted-to nation returns the child anyway,
believing that foster care in the child’s habitual residence is an
appropriate placement until the allegations are resolved. In yet other
cases, the petitioner only has rights of visitation, or only seeks to
31
establish visitation, but the court returns the child anyway, even
though the primary caretaker may not, or cannot, return with the
child. The primary caretaker’s reasons for not returning are varied,
but may include an expired passport, an improper immigration
status, the prospect of being criminally prosecuted upon return, fear
of the petitioner, or an unwillingness to leave a full life in the
abducted-to state. Switzerland succeeded in pointing out the
limitations of the Convention and its defenses, as currently
interpreted, in these types of situations.
In the context of Switzerland’s attempt to expand the
understanding of the Article 13(b) defense, Mr. J. David McClean, a
delegate for the Commonwealth Secretariat who was present at the
Convention’s drafting, provided background for the words
32
He “indicated that the
“intolerable situation” in Article 13(b).

13(b) “grave risk” defense was not established, despite the fact that it was “highly
likely that . . . [the father] engaged in a pattern of excessive corporal punishment
with respect to all three children and domestic violence towards their mother,”
because the Dutch Child Protection Board intended to place the children in foster
care pending an investigation upon their return); see also Nunez Escudero v. TiceMenley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that a baby’s possible
institutionalization during the pendency of the Mexican custody proceedings could
eradicate a grave risk of harm). Sometimes children are placed in foster care in the
United States pending the adjudication of the Hague petition, as were the children
in the Wood case. See, e.g., Arguelles v. Vazquez, No. 08-2030-CM, 2008 WL 913325, at
*6 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 2008) (indicating seven-year-old child was in protective custody
and social worker indicated child was “closely bonded to her mother [the
Respondent] and . . . the more expeditiously [the child] could return to a normal
structured day-to-day existence, the better”).
31. Although the Convention clearly does not permit the remedy of return for
those petitioners who only have rights of access, a number of courts around the
world have held that the remedy applies if the right of access is coupled with a ne
exeat clause prohibiting the child’s removal from the jurisdiction without the
permission of the court or the other parent. There is a split among U.S. courts on
this issue. Compare Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 500 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding
“that a ne exeat clause does not transmute access rights into rights of custody under
the Convention”), and Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2002)
(same), and Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2000), with Furnes v. Reeves,
362 F.3d 702, 716 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that under Norwegian law the ne exeat
clause is a right to custody under the Convention because of a broad definition of
custody that includes “the right to determine the child’s place of residence”), and
Croll, 229 F.3d at 150–53 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting) (citing foreign countries that
believe a ne exeat clause creates a right of custody).
32. Notes of Proceedings, supra note 19.
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words ‘intolerable situation’ in Article 13(b) were meant to be a
33
flexible concept that could address many of the harder cases.” In
particular, he explained that the phrase “intolerable situation” was
added to the 1980 Convention to deal with exceptional cases where a
court could not find a grave risk of harm to the child, but returning
the child would have been absurd as a procedural matter. He further
explained that the provision was prompted by a case in which a
United Kingdom court was asked to return a child to California, even
though everyone recognized that the California court would certainly
34
allow the child’s relocation to the United Kingdom.
The notes of the drafting session suggest that Mr. McClean’s
description is accurate. A U.K. delegate stated:
[I]t was necessary to add the words “or otherwise place the child in
an intolerable situation” since there were many situations not
covered by the concept of “physical and psychological harm.” For
example, where one spouse was subject to threats and violence at
the hands of the other and forced to flee the matrimonial home, it
could be argued that the child suffered no physical or
psychological harm, although it was clearly exposed to an
35
intolerable situation.

This history has been largely ignored and has led to problems in the
36
implementation of the Convention.
The conversation at the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission
breathed life into the term “intolerable situation.”
A report
summarizing the proceedings noted that the experts “emphasi[z]ed
the concept of an ‘intolerable situation[,]’ which was included in
33. Weiner, supra note 27, at 292–93 (citing Notes of Proceedings, supra note
19).
34. Id.
35. See Procès-verbal No 8, 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIÈME SESSION—
CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ—ENLÈVEMENT D’ENFANTS
297, 302 (1982) (reporting the statement of Mr. Jones of the United Kingdom from
the meeting of Tuesday morning, October 14, 1980). Mr. Leal of Canada thought
that “the meeting should not concern itself unduly with such situations [as Mr. Jones
described]. Social workers tended to take different views at different times
concerning the rights and wrongs in these matters.” Id.; see also Shireen Fisher, How
Far Did the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission
Advance the Interpretation of Article 13(1)(b), Grave Risk Defence?, XII The JUDGES’ NEWSL.
54, 56, 58 (2007) (citing both Mr. Jones’ statement in Procès-verbal No 8 from the
meeting of Tuesday morning, October 14, 1980, and Mr. Leal’s response). Judge
Fisher astutely points out how much progress has been made in understanding
domestic violence since Mr. Leal’s remarks. Id. at 58.
36. See generally Carol S. Bruch, The Unmet Needs of Domestic Violence Victims and
Their Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases, 38 FAM. L.Q. 529, 541–42
(2004) (arguing that return orders in cases of domestic violence pose extremely
grave risks because the incidence and severity of abuse increase after the victim tries
to separate from his or her abuser, despite a judge’s efforts or promises to protect
the child or partner).
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Article 13 of the Convention to address those situations where the
return of a child would not necessarily create a grave risk, but where
37
it would still be inappropriate to order the return.” Consequently,
although the delegates decided not to formally expand Article 13(b)
38
to address these hard cases, “[e]ven Switzerland was eventually
satisfied that the difficult cases could be resolved on the basis of the
current text, and that the case law could develop adequately to
39
address these situations.”
After the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission, Switzerland
took unilateral action to ensure that “intolerable situation” would, in
fact, cover future situations like the Wood case, at least in Swiss
40
courts. On December 21, 2007, the Swiss Parliament passed a law
that says an “intolerable situation” exists for purposes of Article 13(b)
when, but not only when, the following criteria are met:
a. placement with the parent who filed the application is manifestly
not in the child’s best interests;
b. the abducting parent is not, given all of the circumstances, in a
position to take care of the child in the State where the child was
habitually resident immediately before the abduction or if this
cannot reasonably be required from this parent; and
c. placement in foster care is manifestly not in the child’s best
41
interests.

37. Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra note 22, ¶ 166.
38. The Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission to Review Operation of the
Convention indicated that the Commission “reaffirms Recommendation 4.3 of the
2001 meeting of the Special Commission: The Article 13, paragraph 1b), ‘grave risk’
defen[s]e has generally been narrowly construed by courts in the Contracting States,
and this is confirmed by the relatively small number of return applications which
were refused on this basis.” See Hague Conference on Private International Law,
October 30–November 9, 2006, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Fifth Meeting of
the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the Practical Implementation of the
Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition,
Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the
Protection of Children, § 1.4.2 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter Conclusions and Recommendations
of the Fifth Meeting].
39. Weiner, supra note 27, at 293.
40. Swiss Federal Act art. 5, Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 36 (2008),
available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher, supra
note 2, at 162. Switzerland also presented another version of its proposal, in the
form of a draft Protocol, to the Permanent Bureau. The Council on General Affairs
and Policy, in April 2008, reserved for “future consideration of the feasibility of a
Protocol containing auxiliary rules designed to improve the operation of the
Convention.” See Bucher, supra note 2, at 145.
41. Swiss Federal Act art. 5, Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 36 (2008),
available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher, supra
note 2, at 162.
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42

The new Swiss Act has other important articles, but most notable
are the provisions that emphasize the child’s autonomy and
independent interest in the proceedings. For example, the Swiss Act
ensures representation for the child. Article 9 states, “The court shall
order that the child be represented and designate as a representative
a person experienced in welfare and legal matters. This person may
43
file applications and lodge appeals.” The Act also requires the court
to “hear the child in an appropriate manner or appoint an expert to
carry out this hearing unless the age of the child or another valid
44
reason prevents this.” These provisions make concrete for all cases
in Swiss courts, not just those involving European Union members,
45
the requirement in Brussels II bis that whenever an Article 12 or 13
defense is raised, “it shall be ensured that the child is given the
opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless this appears
inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of
46
maturity.”
The Swiss Act serves as a concrete reminder that States can
minimize the negative consequences that the Hague Abduction
Convention creates for particular children. The Swiss legislation
should reduce the number of children negatively impacted, and it
does so within the spirit and framework of the Convention. The
Article now discusses the doctrinal and practical significance of these
reforms for litigants in the United States, assuming courts in the
United States were willing to incorporate these Swiss ideas into U.S.
law and practice.

42. The Swiss law has some other interesting provisions, although a discussion of
those provisions is beyond the scope of this Article. For example, the Swiss Act gives
considerable direction about the handling of these cases and wisely recommends
that the Central Authority involve specialists with multidisciplinary knowledge to
assist the family in reaching a voluntary resolution, employing conciliation and
mediation if necessary. See Swiss Federal Act arts. 3, 4, Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale
suisse [FF] 35 (2008), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf,
translated in Bucher, supra note 2, at 162 (setting forth the instructions for the
establishment of a network of experts and institutions to assist in conciliation and
mediation); Bucher, supra note 2, at 145–46 (arguing that the use of experts and
specialists will increase the number of harmonious resolutions that will better reflect
the child’s best interest).
43. Swiss Federal Act art. 9(3), Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 37
(2008), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher,
supra note 2, at 163.
44. Id. art. 9(2).
45. Council Regulation 2201/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1 (EC) (“Brussels II bis”),
available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:338:
0001:0029:EN:PDF.
46. Id. at 6, ch. 2, art. 11(2).
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II. INTOLERABLE SITUATION
Courts in the United States should recognize that “intolerable
situation” is a separate defense to the Convention’s remedy of return,
and accept the Swiss formulation as a good articulation of one type of
47
“intolerable situation.”
A. The Conflation of Intolerable Situation and Grave Risk of Harm
Courts in the United States have given virtually no attention to the
term “intolerable situation.” A close review of cases in the United
States decided since the beginning of 2006 and a summary review of
older cases indicate that courts routinely analyze facts only under the
“grave risk of physical or psychological harm” standard in Article
13(b). Courts either ignore the “intolerable situation” language or
48
assume it is coextensive with the “grave risk of harm” language.
49
Courts in other countries sometimes exhibit a similar imprecision.
Such an interpretation is clearly wrong since the language of the
provision plainly says that return is not required if “there is a grave

47. Courts in the United States could adopt the Swiss interpretation of the
Convention in a manner that was consistent with the approach U.S. courts take to
treaty interpretation. See generally Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between
Uniformity and Progress: The Need for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 296–98
(2002) (arguing that the variety and flexibility of approaches to treaty interpretation
in the U.S. permit consideration of subsequent practice by treaty partners).
48. See, e.g., Diallo v. Bekemeyer, No. 4:07CV1125SNL, 2007 WL 4593502, at *11
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 2007) (analyzing solely under Article 13(b)’s grave risk of harm
provision “hotly disputed” testimony about domestic violence and evidence about
stress in couple’s relationship due to petitioner’s marijuana use); Van Driessch v.
Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 841 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (naming only two
defenses to a wrongful removal claim in case where there were allegations of
domestic violence and drinking problems by the father: a grave risk of physical or
psychological harm and a violation of principles relating to the protection of human
rights or freedoms); Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2005) (reversing
district court’s grant of the Article 13(b) defense based upon the environment in
Australia being intolerable, finding the facts did not show grave risk of harm);
Blondin v. Dubois, 19 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated on separate
grounds, 189 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that return of children would violate
Article 13(b), in part, because children were well-settled in the United States, and a
return to France would cause mother and children to live with father, thereby
presenting a grave risk of psychological harm or an intolerable situation without
distinguishing between the two). But see In re Marriage of Witherspoon, 155 Cal.
App. 4th 963, 967, 974 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing return of children to
Germany, where they would either be in protective custody or in the custody of an
allegedly suicidal mother with an alleged history of drinking and mental health
issues, might be an “intolerable situation” in addition to a “grave risk of harm”).
49. See NIGEL LOWE, MARK EVERALL QC & MICHAEL NICHOLLS, INTERNATIONAL
MOVEMENT OF CHILDREN: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 330 (2004) (“Although the
‘grave risk’ relates to the separate components, namely, physical harm, psychological
harm and placing the child in an intolerable situation, in practice they are rarely
pleaded or treated as distinct exceptions.”).
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risk that [the child’s] return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
50
situation.”
The aggregation of the discrete concepts in the United States is
probably attributable to a report by the U.S. State Department
51
This
prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
report conflated the two provisions in Article 13(b) by using child
52
sexual abuse as the example of an “intolerable situation.” Since
child sexual abuse also poses a “grave risk of physical and
psychological harm” to the child, the two concepts were made to look
coterminous. The State Department said:
“[I]ntolerable situation” was not intended to encompass return to a
home where money is in short supply, or where educational or
other opportunities are more limited than in the requested State.
An example of an “intolerable situation” is one in which a custodial
parent sexually abuses the child. If the other parent removes or
retains the child to safeguard [him or her] against further
victimization, and the abusive parent then petitions for the child’s
return under the Convention, the court may deny the petition.
Such action would protect the child from being returned to an
“intolerable situation” and subjected to a grave risk of
53
psychological harm.

Although the State Department’s example might cause courts to
assume “intolerable situation” and “grave risk of physical or
psychological harm” are co-extensive, this interpretation is not
required by the State Department’s report. The report does not say
that a “grave risk of physical or psychological harm” is required for an
“intolerable situation,” or that child sexual abuse is the only type of
“intolerable situation.” Rather, the language only suggests that the
drafters believed a “grave risk of physical or psychological harm” was
an “intolerable situation.” It would be incorrect to assume that a
“grave risk of physical or psychological harm” is required for an
“intolerable situation,” given the words “or otherwise” in the
provision and the legislative history from the drafting of the
Convention.

50. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 13 (emphasis added).
51. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis].
52. Id. at 10510.
53. Id.
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The State Department’s analysis is generally persuasive authority,
and its report has been cited in numerous judicial opinions that
55
For example, in Blondin v.
blend the two exceptions together.
56
Dubois, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cited the
State Department’s report when discussing the “grave risk of harm”
57
language, not the “intolerable situation” language. It said:
[A]t one end of the spectrum are those situations where
repatriation might cause inconvenience or hardship, eliminate
certain educational or economic opportunities, or not comport
with the child’s preferences; at the other end of the spectrum are
those situations in which the child faces a real risk of being hurt,
physically or psychologically, as a result of repatriation. The
former do not constitute a grave risk of harm under Article 13b;
58
the latter do.

In developing a spectrum for the “grave risk of harm” defense, the
Second Circuit chose examples for one endpoint that had little, if
any, connection to physical or psychological harm. Rather, these
59
examples were offered during the Convention’s drafting, and were
reiterated in the State Department report, to show situations that
would not qualify as an “intolerable situation.” The Second Circuit’s
conflation of the concepts did not affect its analysis in Blondin of

54. See Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that
although the State Department’s analysis is not binding, it is entitled to deference
(citing Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 373 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005))).
55. A search on Westlaw “allcases” database found eighteen cases that cited the
Report’s language, in whole or in part (search conducted July 21, 2008 for the
following: Intolerable w/s situation and “money is in short supply” and Hague).
56. 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001).
57. Id. at 162.
58. Id.
59. The reference to economic or educational disadvantage first appeared in a
report by the Special Commission that led to the initial drafting of a convention. See
Elisa Pérez-Vera, Report of the Special Commission, 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA
QUATORZIEME SESSION—CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE—
ENLEVEMENT D’ENFANTS 173, 203, ¶ 97 (1982) [hereinafter Pérez-Vera, Report of the
Special Commission]. A proposal by the U.S. delegation to tighten the Article 13(b)
defense reiterated the reference. See Procès-verbal No 2, 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA
QUATORZIEME SESSION—CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE—
ENLEVEMENT D’ENFANTS 257, 263, at No. 12 (1982). While delegates agreed that
economic and educational disadvantage should not trigger the defense, see, e.g., id. at
301 (noting the comment of Mr. Holub from the Czechoslovakia delegation), the
U.S. proposal was nonetheless overwhelmingly defeated by a vote of 19 to 5, with
2 abstentions. See id. The Pérez-Vera Explanatory Report explains that it would be
wrong to infer from the rejection of the U.S. proposal that the exceptions should
receive a wide interpretation. See Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, 3 ACTES ET
DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIEME SESSION—CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE—ENLEVEMENT D’ENFANTS 426, 461, at ¶ 116 (1982) [hereinafter
Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report].
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whether the child there faced a grave risk of harm, but it
contributed to the invisibility of the “intolerable situation” defense.
This invisibility has substantive implications for other cases.
B. The Substantive Implications of Disaggregating the Concepts
The failure to disaggregate the “grave risk of harm” and
“intolerable situation” defenses in Article 13(b) has unnecessarily
limited the scope of the “intolerable situation” defense. Most
obviously, something may create an “intolerable situation” for the
child, yet not cause the child a “grave risk of physical or psychological
61
62
harm.”
The separation of siblings is arguably such a situation.

60. An expert testified about the serious psychological harm the children might
experience if they were returned to France, regardless of the French government’s
ability to protect the children from violence. Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163. These were
facts that “belong on the latter end of the spectrum.” Id. at 162.
61. See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 151-54 (1998) (citing cases where the return of a
child might not cause a “grave risk of harm,” yet still might meet the “intolerable
situation” defense).
Some courts have read the provisions together to inform their view of what
constitutes a “grave risk of harm.” These courts have said that the “grave risk of
physical or psychological harm” must rise to a fairly serious level to be relevant. See,
e.g., Lopez v. Alcala, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1260–61 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (citing
Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 253, 286 (Can.) (explaining “otherwise”
means that the harm must be “to a degree that also amounts to an intolerable
situation”)); Re A (A Minor) (Abduction), (1988) 1 Fam. 365, 372 (C.A.) (U.K.)
(upholding judge’s order that returned child and holding that the risk of
psychological harm must be “weighty” and the potential harm “substantial, and not
trivial,” which was supported by the words “or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation”).
This Article takes no position on whether this interpretation is correct or not. It
certainly can be argued that the framers viewed any level of certain harm to a child
to be sufficient to invoke the defense. It would have been easy enough to add the
words “serious” or “life-threatening” before “physical or psychological harm,” which
was not done. In fact, a restrictive interpretation arguably contradicts the Pérez-Vera
report because the report says, without qualifying the type of harm or including the
word “otherwise,” that the Convention’s remedy “gives way before the primary
interest of any person in not being exposed to physical or psychological danger or
being placed in an intolerable situation.” See Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, supra
note 59, at 433, ¶ 29.
62. See Re T (Abduction: Child’s Objections to Return), [2000] 2 Fam. 192, 192–
93 (C.A.) (U.K.) (holding that the younger child of two siblings should not be
returned to Spain alone because this would place the younger child in an
“intolerable situation” given that “the two children had been through difficult times
together; the younger child had been dependent on his sister and she had acted as
his ‘little mother’ at times”); Cour de la Cassation [Cass. 6e civ.] [highest court of
ordinary jurisdiction], June 22, 1999, Bull. Civ. 1999, N 209, M. Lemontey (Fr.). But
see Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro, 131 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(expressing reluctance to separate siblings, but ordering one child’s return pending
determination of other child’s maturity defense, although the respondent may not
have argued that separation of the siblings would be an intolerable situation); In re
L.L., (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 22, 2000), available at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/
fullcase/0273.htm (holding that the separation of an older child, who had reached
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Similarly, removing a child from the child’s primary caretaker and
placing the child in foster care pending the resolution of a custody
dispute may be an “intolerable situation,” even though the
arrangement may not pose a “grave risk of harm” to the child.
Sending a child back to a war zone perhaps qualifies as another such
63
Imposing unnecessary and burdensome travel and
example.
litigation expenses on the family, when the court knows the abductor
64
and child will ultimately be allowed to relocate, might also qualify.
These examples demonstrate that the scope of Article 13(b) is
broader than merely “grave risk of harm.”
Analyzing “intolerable situation” separately from “grave risk of
harm” has another important substantive effect. It actually changes
the likelihood that an Article 13(b) defense will be successful when
the respondent argues that return will pose a “grave risk of harm.”
For a successful “grave risk of harm” defense, many courts now
require both a grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the
child and a lack of ameliorative measures that might reduce the risk
65
Ameliorative measures can include
associated with return.
undertakings by the left-behind parent, or assurances by the central
66
authority or a court in the child’s habitual residence. Many judges
consider ameliorative measures as part of the defense, although this
judicially created amendment to Article 13(b) is now coming under

maturity, from two other children did not pose an intolerable situation for the
younger children should they be returned to their father).
63. Cf. Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 900-01 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
Article 13(b) defense was not established since Israel is not a “zone of war” and the
mother offered insufficient proof of how the fighting would directly put the children
at grave risk of harm); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996)
(saying, in dicta, that the Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” would be made out if
child is in imminent danger prior to resolution of the custody dispute because the
requesting state is a war zone). But cf. Freier v. Freier, 969 F. Supp. 436, 443 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) (holding Article 13(b) defense was not established since Israel is not a
“zone of war” because, in part, the city where the children lived was free from
fighting, and businesses and schools are open).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 32–34.
65. See, e.g., Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 248–49 (2d Cir. 1999) (remanding
the case to the district court to consider the availability of all possible ameliorative
measures that could reduce the risk of harm from the child’s repatriation, not just
those requested in the petition).
66. See, e.g., Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 162 n.11 (2d Cir. 2001). Some
courts believe that even if the court in the requesting state can give the child
adequate protection, the court in the requested state must explore ameliorative
measures in order to reduce the risk attending return. See In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381,
397 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that even though Argentina’s ability to provide
protection was not in question, when ordering the return of a child to Argentina, the
court should carefully tailor the order to include specific protections to ameliorate
the risk of harm since the Argentinean authorities might not act immediately,
including specifying in whose custody the child should be returned).
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67

Where the requirement
considerable criticism by some courts.
exists, it creates a tremendous obstacle for respondents. It is difficult
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that another jurisdiction
cannot, or will not, protect a child, especially if the jurisdiction has a
foster care system. However, this obstacle becomes less formidable if
the “intolerable situation” defense is considered along with the “grave
risk of harm” defense. After all, the availability of foster care should
not be an acceptable way to defeat the “grave risk of harm” defense if
foster care itself poses an “intolerable situation” for the child. It is
illogical to allow an “intolerable situation” to defeat the “grave risk of
harm” defense.
The “intolerable situation” language also has another substantive
implication for courts considering whether to return a child. The
language heightens the importance of broad comprehensive
undertakings. Undertakings have been used to mitigate “grave risks
68
of physical or psychological harm.” The U.S. State Department is
currently trying to reign in courts’ use of undertakings by suggesting
that undertakings have become too broad in scope and too
69
Yet broad and liberal undertakings appear entirely
common.
proper when one focuses on “intolerable situation,” and not simply
“grave risk of harm.” Judge Singer’s opinion in the English case of Re
O (Child Abduction: Undertakings) illustrates the appropriateness of the
70
approach. As to the “intolerable situation,” he stated:
In this case the children would find themselves in an intolerable
situation if upon their return to Greece they were for any
appreciable period to find themselves deprived of the continuity of

67. There are many problems with the judicially created amendments to Article
13(b). Most notably, a judge might have difficulty determining whether the state of
habitual residence can adequately address a risk because the law on the books is
often different than the law as applied. See, e.g., Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1346–
48 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining to require that the responding parent demonstrate
that the “child’s country of habitual residence is unable or unwilling to ameliorate
the grave risk of harm which would otherwise accompany the child’s return” because
the requirement is difficult to prove and was not contemplated by the Convention);
Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 57–71 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the rendering court must determine “that the children will in fact, and not just in
legal theory, be protected if returned” to the abusing parent’s custody). In addition,
protections may at times be inadequate because the harm stems from the children’s
fear of return, regardless of the actual protections that exist. See, e.g., Danaipour v.
McLarey, 386 F.3d 289, 303–04 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that returning the children
to Sweden would definitely result in psychological harm to the children, “regardless
of any possible conditions or undertakings imposed”); Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163 n.11
(finding that “the authorities, through no fault of their own, may not be able to give
the children adequate protection”).
68. Weiner, supra note 27, at 295.
69. Id.
70. Re O (Child Abduction: Undertakings), (1994) 2 Fam. 349, 362 (U.K.).
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day-to-day care hitherto afforded them by their mother. So would
it be if they returned to live in a home shared contrary to her
wishes by the father, or visited by him irrespective of her
opposition. And whereas for many families’ financial constraints
are inevitable . . . , were these children to be subject to a situation
where the resources to finance their customary lifestyle risk being
cut off, that would constitute a situation of hardship severe enough
in the context of their experience to be described as intolerable.
So would it be for them if their mother was unable effectively to
function as their carer, as for instance if she were subject to the
type of extreme emotional bombardment to which marital
disharmony sometimes leads, or if she were subjected to penal
sanction or civil penalty for her actions initially in removing the
children wrongfully, or for the manner in which subsequently she
had resisted an order for their return in these courts. In the local
and social isolation in which the mother would find herself, so
seemingly humdrum a facility as the use or the withholding of a car
might well represent for the children, because of its direct and
indirect impact on their daily lives, the difference between a
71
tolerable situation and one that was not.

To mitigate the grave risk of an intolerable situation that would
have existed if the children were returned, Judge Singer insisted
upon undertakings that would operate until a Greek court became
72
seized of the matter. The father agreed to extensive undertakings,
including not to remove or seek to remove the children from the
mother’s care and control, to provide a car for the mother and to pay
for the costs of its operation, to provide an apartment for the sole
occupation of the mother and children, to pay all the children’s
school fees, and to pay the medical costs of the mother and children.
Further undertakings included agreeing to pay for the mother’s and
children’s return, not to institute or support any proceeding for the
punishment of the mother related to the children’s removal
(whether criminal or civil), to pay the mother’s maintenance, to pay
the mother’s reasonable legal costs for proceedings in Greece, and
73
not to pester her. After finding that these undertakings would be
honored, or at least given some effect by the Greek courts if not
honored, Judge Singer held that these undertakings alleviated the

71. Id. at 349.
72. See id. at 362.
73. Id. at 354; cf. Pantazatou v. Pantazatos, No. FA 96713571, 1997 WL 614572, at
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1997) (imposing broad undertakings so mother could
return to Greece with child and so child would not suffer psychological harm from
separation).
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risk that the children would find themselves in an “intolerable
74
situation.”
C. The Scope of an Intolerable Situation Defense
Before turning to the specifics of the Swiss proposal, it is helpful to
think about the scope of the “intolerable situation” defense. After all,
Judge Singer’s description of what would be intolerable, broad as it
was, deserves some exploration. Moreover, one can only evaluate the
Swiss proposal’s consistency with the Convention by understanding
the scope of “intolerable situation” more generally.
“Intolerable situation” is not defined in the Convention, but the
words “grave risk” and “intolerable” suggest that the defense is
75
narrow. The drafting history reveals that the phrase “intolerable
situation” was supposed to evoke an objective sense that return was
76
unwarranted.
The Special Commission rejected the word
“unacceptable,” believing that an “unacceptable” situation required a
77
highly subjective assessment.
“Intolerable” is commonly understood to mean unbearable. The
Oxford English Dictionary states that “intolerable” means “cannot be
tolerated, borne, or put up with; unendurable, unbearable,
78
insupportable, insufferable.”
Its looser meaning is “[e]xcessive,
79
Adopting what appears to be a
extreme, exceedingly great.”
combination of both the stricter and the looser meanings of the
word, the Court of Appeal for Ontario defined “intolerable” as “an
extreme situation, a situation that is unbearable; a situation too
80
severe to be endured.”
The child’s perspective may be relevant to an assessment of
whether the defense exists, but the child need not believe a situation

74. Re O, (1994) 2 Fam. at 372.
75. This is confirmed by the Pérez-Vera Explanatory Report, which calls for all
the defenses to be interpreted in a “restrictive fashion.” Pérez-Vera, Explanatory
Report, supra note 59, at 434, ¶ 34.
76. Id. ¶ 33.
77. See Pérez-Vera, Report of the Special Commission, supra note 59, at 203, ¶ 97
(noting that the Special Commission “had in mind an objective case” and rejected
replacing the word “intolerable” with “unacceptable” “because this latter word
comprises an element of subjective evaluation which had to be avoided”).
78. 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 10 (2d ed. 1989).
79. Id.
80. Jabbaz v. Mouammar, [2003] 171 O.A.C. 102, 109 (Ont. Ct. App.) (Can.); see
also In re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1
A.C. 619, 639 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (“‘Intolerable’ is a strong
word, but when applied to a child must mean ‘a situation which this particular child
in these particular circumstances should not be expected to tolerate.’”).
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is intolerable for it to be so. A child may be unaware of, or not care
about, grave risks that adults would agree exposed the child to an
“intolerable situation.” Cases involving an infant, for example, might
fall into this category. Nor is the child’s view that something is
intolerable determinative; a child may find an experience
82
“intolerable” even though reasonable adults would disagree. For
example, the child may find it unbearable to leave a school where the
child has developed many close friends, although adults might
conclude that the benefits of departure outweigh the disadvantages
and that the child’s angst will be transitory. Yet, at some point, the
child’s views, even if initially unconvincing to reasonable adults, may
change the adults’ views. The duration and depth of the child’s
unhappiness (or likely unhappiness) should cause a reassessment of
whether the situation is, in fact, intolerable. Few adults can stand to
see a child in utter despair. This objective approach, which takes
account of the child’s feelings without making them determinative,
aligns with the drafters’ desire to protect individual children from
intolerable situations while at the same time limiting the breadth of
the defense.
83
A situation can be physically, mentally, or morally “intolerable.” It
seems likely that the “intolerable situation” defense encompasses a
morally intolerable situation. After all, the “grave risk of harm”
provision already addresses physical and mental harm to a child, and
“intolerable situation” would be surplusage if its meaning were the
84
same as “grave risk of physical or psychological harm.” In addition,
the Special Commission that proposed the Convention “intended
[the term psychological harm] to cover both the mental harm and a
certain aspect of the moral harm, but it . . . knowingly avoided the
latter expression which is too vague and which could even be
85
The same
interpreted as encompassing religious convictions.”
intention likely also exists with respect to the phrase “intolerable
situation,” if for no other reason than moral harm fits equally well, if
not better, with that defense than with the defense of psychological
harm.

81. Cf. In re D, [2007] 1 A.C. at 641–43 (discussing the importance of listening to
children and describing the difference between taking account of a child’s view and
doing what the child wants).
82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
83. 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 10 (2d ed. 1989).
84. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.6, at
230–31, 237 (7th ed. 2007) (provisions in a statute should be interpreted so as not to
render any of the terms surplusage).
85. See Pérez-Vera, Report of the Special Commission, supra note 59, at 203.
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Examples given by the drafters, as well as subsequent case law, also
support the conclusion that an “intolerable situation” is a morally
intolerable situation. The fact patterns that give rise to the claim of
an “intolerable situation” are all broadly similar: the benefits of
return seem dubious for a particular child. Yet the outcomes vary
depending upon the type, degree, and likelihood of suffering the
child might experience. For example, “the Special Commission
thought that the exception would not apply if the child’s return was
86
thought to be prejudicial to his economic or educational future.”
An Ontario appellate court held that a left-behind mother’s
uncertain immigration status in the United States did not make the
return of the child to the United States an “intolerable situation,”
87
especially since she would only be deported, if at all, to Canada. On
the other hand, an Israeli court held that the inability of a mother to
support her children in the child’s habitual residence placed them in
88
89
an “intolerable situation.” A court in England ruled similarly. The
cases reflect an assessment of what sacrifices society can morally
expect from an individual child for purposes of benefiting the greater
good, e.g., generally deterring abduction. This highly fact-dependent
assessment is nothing more than a question of morality with a

86. Id. at 203, ¶ 97.
87. Jabbaz v. Mouammar, [2003] 171 O.A.C. 102, 110 (Ont. Ct. App.) (Can.).
88. Family Appeal 621/04, D.Y. v. D.R., in The Hague Conference on Private
International Law, October 30–November 9, 2006, Collated Responses to the
Questionnaire Concerning the Practical Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Prelim. Doc. No. 2 , at 200
(Oct. 2006), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd_pd02efs2006.pdf
[hereinafter Collated Responses].
89. In re J [Abduction: Acquiring Custody Rights By Caring for Child], [2005] 2
FLR 791. The court in In re J found that the petitioner did not have rights of
custody. Id. ¶ 25. In the alternative, the court held that returning the child would
place the child in an intolerable situation. Id. ¶ 30 Both parents were English, and
returning the child to Greece would mean that the parties would be litigating in a
foreign language that neither spoke fluently. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31. During the pendency of
the Greek proceedings, which could take considerable time, the mother would live in
Greece without “a degree of comfort.” Id. ¶ 32. The mother would probably have to
rely upon social security, all the while unable to work to pay off a very large credit
card debt because her housing would be remote and she would not have a workable
car. Id.
There are other cases where the defense has been established. One author
reports, “[a] court in Ireland refused to return abducted children to their father
because it felt that the father’s inability to manage money, which in turn caused the
family’s eviction nine times, was an ‘intolerable situation.’ A French court refused to
return a child to Los Angeles based on the belief that the environment is polluted
and therefore dangerous to the child’s health. Similarly, a German court refused
return of children to England since German is not spoken in English schools or in
the children’s home.” Lisa Nakdai, Note, It’s 10 P.M., Do You Know Where Your
Children Are?, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 251, 255 (2002) (citations omitted).
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90

The “intolerable situation” defense is
utilitarian emphasis.
established at the point that the disadvantage faced by an individual
child outweighs the potential benefits all children receive from
deterring international abduction. The drafters hoped to set a high
enough threshold for intolerability so that observers would agree that
the type and degree of hardship were not justified in a particular
91
case.
The Swiss formulation of “intolerable situation” identifies a
situation that most observers would find morally intolerable. It is a
good formulation because the defense has as its centerpiece the
requirement that the child will be separated from his or her primary
caregiver, an event that is likely to be difficult, if not unbearable, for
both the child and the parent, and that has identifiable risks for the
92
child. Since placement with the left-behind parent also has to be
manifestly not in the child’s best interest, the left-behind parent has
less moral claim to the child’s return. The abductor must also have a
morally defensible reason for not returning with the child.
Consequently, the Swiss formulation has intuitive appeal.
Nonetheless, whether a grave risk of a morally “intolerable situation”
exists ultimately depends upon the particular facts of the case, and it
90. Professor Graglia has a succinct and helpful description of utilitarian
morality:
The usual distinction is between a principle-based morality, as advocated by
Immanuel Kant, and utilitarianism, a morality based on consequences. . . .
Utilitarianism maintains that the rightness or wrongness of conduct depends
on its consequences. To a secularist claiming no aid from the supernatural,
the above assertion seems self-evident. How is it possible to judge an action
except by its consequences? Kantian tradition answers by judging an action’s
inherent justice or rightness, which should somehow be determined apart
from and regardless of consequences. “Do justice,” the Kantian view advises,
“though the heavens fall”—that is, do what is inherently right, even though it
brings about an unimaginable disaster. Surely that has to be wrong: If doing
justice will bring about an unimaginable disaster, we must rethink our idea
of justice.
Lino A. Graglia, Government Promotion of Moral Issues: Gambling, Smoking, and
Advertising, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 69 (2008) (citation omitted).
91. In this sense, the defense differs from the rejected public policy defense
because that defense relied solely on the public policy of the requested state.
Weiner, Strengthening Article 20, supra note 29, at 708–10.
92. See Swiss Federal Act art. 5, Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 36
(2008), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher,
supra note 2, at 162–63 (outlining situations, such as placement in foster care, that
are intolerable situations); cf. Carol Bruch, Sound Research or Wishful Thinking in Child
Custody Cases? Lessons for Relocation Law, 40 FAM. L.Q. 281, 285–86 (2006) (citing
research indicating that a child’s relationship with his or her mother during infancy
and early childhood significantly affects his or her ability to develop and sustain
intimate relationships during the child’s lifetime). See generally M. Rutter, Maternal
Deprivation Reassessed, in IV CHILD WELFARE: MAJOR THEMES IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL
WELFARE 162 (Nick Frost ed., 2005) (canvassing issues and understandings since
Bowlby’s 1951 review of the field).
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is impossible to say categorically that all fact patterns satisfying the
Swiss criteria should qualify for the defense. For example, an
assessment of moral intolerability may require determining whether
the primary caretaker became such solely by virtue of the abduction.
D. The Use of the Swiss Formulation for Hard Cases
The benefit of the “intolerable situation” defense, and the Swiss
formulation, is quite evident in one of those situations for which the
Swiss law was designed. It helps address the problem of primary
caretakers who flee with their children to avoid domestic violence.
These abductors sometimes have trouble defeating an application for
their children’s return even though the courts acknowledge the
93
violence in their lives. Some courts are unable to appreciate the
connection between domestic violence against the parent and the
94
physical and psychological well-being of the child. Other courts do
not understand that a situation can be dangerous even if the physical
95
violence is only “sporadic.” Fortunately, courts in the United States
are becoming increasingly sensitive to the relevancy and sufficiency of

93. See Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic
Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 654–58 (2000) (noting cases in which violence
against an adult was held not to create a “grave risk of harm” for a child and cases in
which courts defer to the returning jurisdiction to provide adequate protection).
94. See id.; Merle H. Weiner, Strengthening Article 20, supra note 29, at 717–18; see,
e.g., Laguna v. Avila, No. 07-CV-5136 (ENV), 2008 WL 1986253, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May
7, 2008) (stating that mother’s allegations that father was physically violent toward
her and abused alcohol were irrelevant because there was no evidence that father
ever abused child or was likely to do so); Nunez v. Ramirez, No. CV 07-01205-PHXEHC, 2008 WL 898658, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008) (finding allegations that parties
had intense arguments and that father allegedly struck the mother, including once
in front of their child, to be irrelevant to whether the children would be placed in an
intolerable situation or face a grave risk of harm); Diallo v. Bekemeyer, No.
4:07CV1125SNL, 2007 WL 4593502, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 2007) (finding
contested evidence of domestic violence against the mother and evidence of stress in
the relationship to be irrelevant to Article 13(b) because there was no evidence that
petitioner directed any violence towards the children); Van Driessche v. OhioEsezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 828, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“[A]lthough Smith alleges Van
Driessche was abusive to her, she does not allege he was abusive to [the child].”); In
re A.V.P.G. and C.C.P.G., 251 S.W.3d 117, 128 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (“Even with
allegations of physical abuse to the spouse, grave risk is not proven when there is no
evidence that the non-abducting party physically abused the children.”).
95. Some courts still discount domestic violence because it is “sporadic.” See, e.g.,
Arguelles v. Vazquez, No. 08-2030-CM, 2008 WL 913325, at *13-*14 (D. Kan. Mar. 17,
2008) (stating the child witnessing a few instances of violence not directed toward
her did not place her at risk); McManus v. McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 & n.5
(D. Mass. 2005) (noting that “[e]vidence of real but sporadic or isolated incidents of
physical abuse, or of some limited incidents aimed at persons other than the child at
issue, have not been found sufficient to support application of the ‘grave risk’
exception[,]” and finding that respondent’s alleged violence “appears isolated and
remote in time, and importantly, was allegedly directed at [the mother] and not the
children who are the subject of the petition for return”).

2008] INTOLERABLE SITUATIONS AND COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN

357
96

domestic violence for the Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” defense,
97
although there is still considerable resistance. The district court’s

96. Numerous courts in the United States have recognized that physical abuse
perpetuated against the abductor is relevant to the Article 13(b) defense, even
absent physical abuse to the children. For cases where courts have granted the
Article 13(b) defense based upon allegations of violence toward the mother with
minimal, if any, direct abuse of the children, see, e.g., Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340,
1346 (11th Cir. 2008) (determining that the father’s previous violent acts
contributed to the grave risk of harm if the child were returned to the father); Walsh
v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 221 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding the father’s continued disregard
of court orders suggested that he would violate any undertakings he made to ensure
the children’s safety); Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06 Civ. 4259(PKC), 2007 WL
2600862, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (pointing to a doctor’s conclusion that a risk
of future abuse to the children existed because of repeated abuse towards the
mother); Elyashiv v. Elyashiv, 353 F. Supp. 2d 394, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (despite the
fact that one of the three children was never physically abused and not suffering
post-traumatic stress disorder, court found a grave risk of physical and psychological
harm if that child were returned); Dimer v. Dimer, No. 99-2-03610-7SEA (Wash. Super.
Ct. July 29, 1999), available at http://www.incadat.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=
convtext.showFull&code=218&lng=1 (granting Article 13(b) defense because of
violence perpetrated against mother).
In some cases, the respondent has alleged that the petitioner committed acts of
violence against both the child and mother, and the courts view the violence in the
family as cumulative. See, e.g., Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 608 (6th Cir. 2007); In
re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 396 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431
F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005); Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, No. 05 CV 1182, 2008
WL 239150, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2008); Elyashiv, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 408; Reyes
Olguin v. Cruz Santana, No. 03 CV 6299 JG, 2005 WL 67094, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,
2005); Blondin v. DuBois, 19 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
97. While more and more courts recognize that adult domestic violence is
relevant to the “grave risk of harm defense,” some courts still dismiss the violence
because it is only “sporadic.” See supra note 95. These courts do not understand that
“sporadic” violence needs to be contextualized within the parties’ relationship before
it can be discounted. Some batterers exercise substantial power and control short of
physical violence, and the use of occasional battery reinforces their ability to
maintain power and control through fear, humiliation, and other means. See, e.g.,
Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Toward A
New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 743 (2005) (explaining coercive control and
the various acts that contribute to it); Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From
Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 985–86 (1995)
(indicating that “physical violence may not be the most significant factor about most
battering relationships” and that “sporadic” violence can reinforce other methods of
control). A court cannot make an assessment of dangerousness by merely
characterizing the violence as sporadic, without considering all of the abusive
behavior. Some batterers who exercise only sporadic violence can be quite
dangerous. See, e.g., Stark, supra, at 1017–18 (noting examples where the overall
violence level in the relationship has been low). The danger can be to the child.
Stark states:
Although all battering relationships present the serious risk that the
batterer will hurt the mother by hurting her child, particularly when
the violence level is high, it is most convincing as a post-separation
strategy when the overall level of violence in the relationship has been
low (for example, where possible means of control such as withdrawal
or absence from the home have been dominant). Signs of tangential
spouse abuse include little interest in parenting prior to the divorce,
the Father insisting on a protracted custody fight despite little chance
of success, the Father exhibiting a highly defensive personal style,
lacking empathy for mother or children, and being unwilling to accept

358

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:335

opinions in Adan v. Avans, discussed below, demonstrate the
lingering reluctance of some courts to regard domestic violence
allegations as relevant to the “grave risk of harm” defense, and more
importantly for purposes of this Article, their disregard of the
98
The Swiss formulation of
“intolerable situation” language.
responsibility for any violence, control tactics, substance use, or other
problems. Another important sign is the children’s fear of their father.
Id.
The coercion and control in the relationship are also relevant to whether
returning the child poses a grave risk that the children will be placed in an
“intolerable situation.” The absence of continuous physical violence says nothing
about the harm to the victim from the controlling behavior and the consequent
effect on the children. Cf. Leslie A. Sackett & Daniel G. Saunders, The Impact of
Different Forms of Psychological Abuse on Battered Women, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 105, 113
(1999) (finding “psychological abuse was a much stronger predictor of fear than
physical abuse”); id. at 105 (“72% of the battered women [in one study] reported
that emotional abuse had a more severe impact than physical abuse . . . .”) (citing
D.R. Follingstad et al., The Role of Emotional Abuse in Physically Abusive Relationships, 5 J.
FAM. VIOL. 107 (1990)); see also Lauren Bennett, Lisa Goodman & Mary Ann Dutton,
Risk Assessment Among Batterers Arrested for Domestic Assault: The Salience of Psychological
Abuse, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1190, 1191, 1199–2000 (2000) (indicating that
psychological abuse had a strong predictive power of reabuse within three months of
charges for misdemeanor domestic violence).
For an example of how courts miss the significance of coercion and control, see
Arguelles, 2008 WL 913325, at *3, *4, *14 (discounting significance of allegations
related to power and control, including threat that petitioner was “capable of killing”
if respondent ever left him, suicidal acts by petitioner, and admissions that he “felt
like hurting his wife,” because acts were “limited” and not directed at child). But see
Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06 Civ. 4259(PKC), 2007 WL 2600862, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
31, 2007) (finding “petitioner repeatedly, and for a period of years, inflicted upon
respondent physical, verbal and psychological abuse” and concluding petitioner “was
very controlling and respondent was afraid to disobey him for fear of retribution”).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently addressed the range of
physical violence that exists in relationships and categorized it for purposes of the
Article 13(b) defense. See Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2007)
(suggesting three broad categories of abusive situations exist: (1) the abuse is
relatively minor, so the 13(b) defense most likely will not be met; (2) the abuse is
“clearly grave, such as where there is credible evidence of sexual abuse, other
similarly grave physical or psychological abuse, death threats, or serious neglect,” so
13(b) defense most likely will be granted; and (3) the abuse falls somewhere between
these two extremes, so whether a 13(b) defense is granted is highly fact-specific).
This categorization has already been cited by other courts. See, e.g., Giuseppe v.
Giuseppe, No. 07-CV-15240, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29785, at *11–13 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
11, 2008). Notably, the Sixth Circuit did not say that relatively minor abuse cannot
establish the defense, only that it is “unlikely.” Simcox, 511 F.3d at 607. For cases “in
the middle” of the violence spectrum, the court noted the “fact-intensive inquiry,”
“including the nature and frequency of the abuse, the likelihood of its recurrence,
and whether there are any enforceable undertakings that would sufficiently
ameliorate the risk of harm to the child caused by its return.” Simcox, 511 F.3d at
607–08. To accomplish this inquiry, courts must look at the nature of the abuse,
which goes beyond considering the number of times a party has been hit.
98. See generally Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711 (D.N.J.
July 30, 2007), rev’d, In re Adan, 2008 WL 4368881 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2008); Adan v.
Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 1850910 (D.N.J. June 25, 2007) (deciding case
on remand), rev’d, In re Adan, 2008 WL 4368881 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2008). To be
clear, some courts abroad have considered it to be an “intolerable situation” if the
mother faced possible domestic violence upon return. See, e.g., PF v. MF, [1992]
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“intolerable situation” seems particularly apt and helpful for
respondents and children who face a situation like that alleged in
Adan.
E. An Example: Adan v. Avans
99

The district court’s decisions in Adan v. Avans, both before and
after the Third Circuit’s first appellate decision in the case, illustrate
the difficulties some respondents still face when they allege they are
victims of domestic violence and try to invoke the Article 13(b) “grave
risk of harm” defense.
1.

The facts
Adan involved a naturalized U.S. citizen mother (Avans), who fled
100
The father (Adan) had
to the United States with her daughter.
abused the mother in Argentina, and the mother alleged that he had
101
also abused their daughter, Arianna. The mother claimed that the
102
The father
Argentinean police and courts did not protect her.
invoked the Hague Convention to obtain Arianna’s return to
103
Argentina.
At the initial hearing, the mother alleged very serious domestic
violence, claiming that the father was violent to her over the course of
104
their relationship. Among other things, he allegedly “locked her in
his bedroom, beat her, threatened her with further harm if she ever
left him[,]” “tried to suffocate her with a pillow,” threatened “to
drown the child if Avans ever left him,” “pushed her while holding
[the child,]” screamed in the infant’s ear until Avans agreed to return
to him, threatened Avans and the child with a gun, chained the gate
of Avans’s home shut so she could not leave, and raped her in front
105
of their daughter.
Avans also alleged that Adan sexually abused
their daughter. She claimed that she found a pubic hair on the
three-year-old’s vagina, that her daughter said that she bathed with
her father and that he “loves [her] with his tongue” (i.e., kissed her
by putting his tongue inside her mouth), and that the father “‘was
2 I.R. 390 (Ir.), available at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0102.htm
(holding the return of children to father would be an “intolerable situation” where
the father was violent toward the mother and one of the children, and the father
financially neglected the children).
99. Adan, 2007 WL 1850910; Adan, 2007 WL 2212711.
100. In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2006).
101. Id. at 386–87.
102. Id. at 386.
103. Id. at 385.
104. Id. at 385–87.
105. Id. at 385–86.
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putting something hot in her butt’ that hurt.” The mother claimed
that the Argentinean police and court system did nothing to help her
107
She
because the father paid bribes to the police and judges.
claimed, for example, that the police did not enforce her temporary
108
restraining order when the father allegedly violated it. The mother
took her daughter to the United States after that incident, although
the Argentinean trial court had not yet adjudicated her allegations
109
against the father.
The district court issued a one-sentence order granting the father’s
110
petition for his daughter’s return.
The court’s oral comments
revealed that the court did not believe the allegations amounted to a
111
“grave risk,” and even if they did, the child should be returned
because “‘this matter is best determined by Argentinean courts
because it is all interwoven with a struggle . . . for custody and
determination of domestic abuse, which is not the purpose of the
112
Convention.’”
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated
the district court’s order and remanded the case. The Third Circuit
thought that the allegations, if true, would give rise to a successful
113
Article 13 defense.
The appellate court could not determine,
however, whether the evidence of child abuse was clear and
convincing and whether the Argentinean courts were incapable or
114
unwilling to give the child adequate protection. The Third Circuit
criticized the district court for ignoring “large portions of [the
mother’s] testimony” and adopting “an overly compartmentalized
115
view of child abuse.” For example, the trial court ignored Avans’s
testimony regarding the child’s baths with her father and the father’s
116
screaming in the child’s ear. The appellate court noted that Adan
denied sexually assaulting his daughter, but “he did not specifically
117
The Third Circuit instructed the
deny particular acts of abuse.”
district court to consider the totality of the circumstances on remand,

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 386.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id. at 386.
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118

acts look more
for this approach might make “innocent”
119
ominous.
The Third Circuit also focused on the domestic violence
allegations. It found those allegations independently significant,
even without taking account of three pieces of evidence that Avans
120
The appellate
tried to use to supplement the record on appeal.
court noted the father’s denials, but again commented that “he did
121
not specifically deny particular acts of abuse” at the hearing.
The
Third Circuit criticized the lower court for its lack of findings on
specific allegations, such as “the allegations that Adan abused Avans
122
and raped her in front of Arianna.” Also, the district court “did not
reject Avans’s testimony that she had been repeatedly abused, raped,
123
and threatened with a gun.”
The Third Circuit held that the evidence of domestic violence,
standing alone, was sufficient to establish a “grave risk of harm” to
Arianna:
[T]he evidence of Adan’s abuse of Avans is relevant to the District
Court’s determination of whether returning Arianna to Argentina
would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. See, e.g., Walsh v.
Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 (1st Circuit) (holding that such evidence
is relevant when considering whether a grave risk of harm to a
child exists because ‘credible social science literature establishes
that serial spousal abusers are also likely to be child abusers’ and
‘both state and federal law have recognized that children are at
increased risk of physical and psychological injury themselves when
they are in contact with a spousal abuser’).124

118. Id. at 396–97. For example, the trial court said that the statement that he
“love[d] [her] with his tongue” is “not significant because . . . it’s not unusual in this
country at least for parents and grandparents to at times in playing with young
toddlers to kiss them with tongues on the cheeks and then sometimes the tongue
may have gone too far.” Id. at 388.
119. See id. at 397 (suggesting that although the manner of kissing the child might
on its own seem innocent, “when coupled with [the mother’s other] reports . . . such
an incident is far less susceptible to innocent explanation”).
120. The evidence was the following: (1) documents that showed Avans now had
a permanent restraining order against Adan in New Jersey because he apparently
repeatedly violated the temporary order; (2) an e-mail from Adan to Avans in 2004
that said, “when I see you I think I will rape you totally”; and (3) another e-mail from
2004 that said, “now that my mind is clear from drugs and from alcohol I can realize
all the time I lost and all the damages I caused you, (and [Arianna]).” Id. at 388.
121. Id. at 386.
122. Id. at 388.
123. Id. at 396. In fact, the district court “discounted” the gun incident, which it
thought was relevant to proving a “grave risk of harm” to the child, because it
happened approximately twenty-three months before Avans removed the child from
Argentina. Id. at 388.
124. Id. at 396 n.6.
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By citing Walsh, the Third Circuit acknowledged that domestic
violence poses risks to children in addition to the risk that the
perpetrator will also abuse the child. Walsh cited state and federal
laws and cases that explicitly discussed the potential for children to
be physically harmed by violence that is directed at the adult victim,
as well as the potential for emotional harm from witnessing the
125
abuse.
The Third Circuit also addressed Argentina’s ability to protect the
mother and child, on the theory that the availability of such
126
protection defeats an Article 13(b) defense.
The Third Circuit
noted that the district court had not sufficiently analyzed Argentina’s
127
ability to protect Avans and her daughter.
Avans testified about her numerous experiences with Argentine law
enforcement when police officers refused to offer her any
assistance, and the fact that Adan violated a temporary restraining
order issued by an Argentine court after the police refused to
enforce it. Adan did not contest these allegations in his testimony,
and the District Court did not discount Avans’ testimony. . . . It
therefore failed to consider and reject the majority of Avans’s proof
128
related to the inaction of Argentine courts and police.
129

On remand, Avans lost again. Judge Walls, the judge who initially
ordered the return of the child, again ordered that the child be
130
returned. This time, however, the court made detailed findings of
fact. Although the court believed that Adan committed domestic
131
132
violence, it thought that Avans exaggerated the violence.
It
discounted Avans’s allegations because she added new allegations of

125. See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing, inter alia, H.R.
Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 104 Stat. 182, 5182 (1990) that says “[w]hereas children
often become targets of physical abuse themselves or are injured when they attempt
to intervene on behalf of a parent,” and Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 439
(Mass. 1996), where the court noted, “[i]t is well documented that witnessing
domestic violence, as well as being one of its victims, has a profound impact on
children. . . . There are significant reported psychological problems in children who
witness domestic violence.”) (citation omitted).
126. In re Adan, 437 F.3d at 395.
127. Id. at 396.
128. Id. at 397–98.
129. Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 1850910, at *14 (D.N.J. June
25, 2007), rev’d, In re Adan, 544 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008).
130. Id.
131. The district court found “that Avans was the subject of domestic abuse from
time to time by the Petitioner and that what she alleges, in the main, is plausible.”
Id. at *11. This included a finding that “[a]t times, [Adan] resorted to using force.”
Id.
132. The court refused to accept all of Avans’s allegations and did not find that
the abuse was “chronic and pervasive.” Id. The court thought Avans “exaggerated
and embellished the abuse in order to prevail in court.” Id.
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134

violence on remand and returned to Adan three times. It also did
not believe that the domestic violence made the allegations of child
135
sexual abuse more probable; in fact, it found that Avans had not
136
proven the alleged child abuse by clear and convincing evidence.
The court never considered whether the domestic violence alone
created any risks to the child other than the alleged sexual abuse.
The court also concluded that Avans failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that “Argentine authorities are unable or
137
unwilling to protect her and her child.” The court believed that the
particular judge scheduled to hear the matter in Argentina was not
138
corrupt.
The Argentinean judge had assured the U.S. court that
the child would not be returned to her father pending the hearing,
139
but would be placed in foster care. Apparently, the child was to be
taken into protective custody by a social worker upon arrival in
140
Argentina, even though the mother might return to Argentina
141
also.
142
The court denied Avans’s request that it reconsider its decision.
Avans claimed the court “committed clear error in finding that the
child had not been sexually abused without ordering an independent
143
evaluation of [the child] to determine as much.” In response, the
court chastised Avans for suggesting that it should have ordered an
examination for the child, noting that the court had no obligation to
sua sponte order an examination and that neither party had requested
144
it. The court also noted that Avans could have, but did not, put in
145
her own evidence on this point.
The court reiterated that even if
133. See id. (“For example, Avans makes far greater allegations of abuse by Adan
now than in her earlier June 2005 testimony without any explanation why she
omitted such earlier. . . . This Court is not clearly convinced of the believability of
such ‘latter’ allegations.”).
134. The court also inferred that the abuse was not as bad as alleged because
“Avans has returned to Adan on at least three different occasions over the course of
their relationship.” Id.
135. Id. at *12.
136. Id. at *13.
137. Id.
138. See id. at *14 (arguing that one could just as easily read news stories that
highlight potential shortcomings in the United States court system and further
explaining that “no specific evidence has been presented to suggest that the
proceeding which will take places in San Martin . . . will be anything other than fair
and appropriate”).
139. Id. at *13.
140. Id. at *14.
141. Id. at *6.
142. Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711, at *7 (D.N.J. July 30,
2007).
143. Id. at *2.
144. See id. at *2–3.
145. Id. at *3.
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sexual abuse were found, the Argentinean court system could protect
146
Avans also wanted the court to consider post-hearing
the child.
evidence that the petitioner was convicted of contempt for violating
147
the restraining order. The court held that the contempt conviction
was irrelevant because the event occurred after the hearing on
148
The court put an exclamation mark at the end of its
remand.
149
decision: it refused to stay its decision pending appeal.
150
The Third Circuit did, however, grant a stay. The case was fully
briefed and argued orally. Avans was permitted to supplement the
appellate record with a psychological report detailing an examination
of Arianna that was conducted after the district court’s order was
151
issued.
On the day of oral argument, the Third Circuit, in an amazing
show of resolve, ruled from the bench that there was a grave risk of
harm as a matter of law. It reversed the trial court and stated that a
judgment order be entered “yesterday” denying the father’s
152
petition. The panel focused on a report from Department of Youth
and Family Services that detailed the risks of physical and
psychological harm that Arianna would face if she were returned, as
153
well as other evidence. The Court of Appeals expressed dismay that
the district court gave no consideration to various pieces of evidence
suggesting psychological and physical harm before making its
154
ruling. It is unclear whether the Third Circuit will issue a written
opinion, but hopefully one will be forthcoming because lower courts
still need guidance on the “grave risk of harm” component of Article
13(b).

146. See id. at *4 (explaining that “a ninety-day restraining order [against Adan]
was granted” to Avans leading up to the trial in Argentina and that there was no
evidence that the Argentinean courts could not appropriately protect the child).
147. Id.
148. See id. (stating that a motion to reconsider is used to bring information to the
court’s attention that existed at the time of the hearing and that may have changed
the court’s decision; it is not to be used to extend the time for litigating a matter).
149. Id. at *7.
150. E-mail from Daniel Mulvihill to Merle H. Weiner, July 21, 2008 (on file with
author).
151. Id.
152. E-mail from Leonard Evans to Jeffrey Edleson and Erika Sussman, Sept. 23,
2008 (on file with author).
153. Id.; Bob Braun, Court Spares Girl, 8, From Deportation, Newark Star Ledger,
Sept. 23, 2008, http://blog.nj.com/njv_bob_braun/2008/09/court_spares_girl_8_
from_depor.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
154. E-mail from Evans, supra note 152. Braun reports that Judge Garth cited
twelve pieces of evidence regarding the abuse of the mother and child that the judge
had improperly excluded. See Braun, supra note 153.
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Was the situation in Adan an “intolerable situation”?
It is easy to find fault with the district court’s analysis in Adan v.
Avans. Among other things, the court’s reasons for finding that
155
Avans exaggerated the domestic violence are subject to criticism.

2.

155. The court was correct that Avans made new allegations of violence against
Adan at the hearing on remand. Some of the new allegations had independent
corroboration, suggesting that they were not manufactured. For example, Avans’s
older son claimed he witnessed Adan choking Avans, forcing her head under water,
and locking her in the backyard in 1999. See Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW),
2007 WL 1850910, at *9 (D.N.J. June 25, 2007), rev’d, In re Adan, 2008 WL 4368881
(3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2008).
The fact that some allegations were new does not mean the allegations were
fabricated or others exaggerated. First, the remand hearing occurred two years after
the initial hearing on the Hague petition. Compare In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 381 (3d
Cir. 2006) (noting that Adan’s petition was filed in 2005), with Adan, 2007 WL
1850910, at *1 (dealing with the remand hearing in 2007). The timing of the
remand hearing gave the respondent time to recall all of the abuse and made it more
likely that any repression of the abuse had abated. See Mary Ann Dutton,
Understanding Women’s Reponses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman
Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1221–22 (1993) (“Numerous indicators of
psychological distress and dysfunction have been identified as sequelae to physical
and sexual violence. These include . . . difficulty concentrating, or memory
problems such as amnesia and dissociation . . . .”) (citing, inter alia, Loewenstein,
Psychogenic Amnesia and Psychogenic Fuge: A Comprehensive Review, in DISSOCIATIVE
DISORDERS: A CLINICAL REVIEW 47 (David Spiegel et al., eds., 1987)); Stephanie
Vitanza, Laura C.M. Vogel, & Linda L. Marshall, Distress and Symptoms of Postraumatic
Stress Disorder in Abused Women, 10 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 23, 24, 31 (1995) (citing data
that showed 33% to 84% of women seeking help as victims of physical violence have
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder).
Second, Avans’s attorneys may have decided that Avans should testify to all of the
abuse on remand to show better the long-term pattern of violence and emotional
harm directed at Avans, especially as the Third Circuit had indicated that domestic
violence toward the parent is itself relevant. See In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 398 (3d Cir.
2006) (directing the district court to take into account allegations of abuse to both
Arianna and her mother). This strategy, and the new allegations, should have
buttressed her argument, not undermined it. In addition, her attorneys may have
suggested that Avans should include some details about why she returned to Adan on
three occasions. This testimony raised additional allegations of violence: Avans said
that “she moved back to Argentina out of fear that Adan would hurt the child if she
did not”; that she “did not want to put her cousin through the ordeal of having Adan
show up uninvited and make a scene” because he was harassing her; and finally, that
“she returned because Adan had threatened to come to the United States and kill
her and Arianna if she did not.” Adan, 2007 WL 1850910, at *10. The court did not
believe her reasons, and interpreted her actions as demonstrating that “the alleged
abuse was not as bad as” she claimed. Id. at *12.
The district court made a point of criticizing the lack of corroborating evidence
for some of Avans’s claims. For example, the court said “Avans did not submit any
police reports into evidence.” Id. at *9. Apparently Avans’s counsel tried to submit
photocopies of documents, but the court insisted that the documents comply with
the Federal Rules of Evidence and be properly authenticated. See e-mail from Daniel
Mulvihill, supra note 150 (on file with author). This requirement was directly
contrary to federal law, which expressly says documents in Hague proceedings need
not be authenticated. See 42 U.S.C. § 11605 (2006) (stating that “no authentication
of such application, petition, document, or information shall be required in order
for the [Hague Convention] application, petition, document, or information to be
admissible in court”).
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Yet for purposes of this analysis, it is sufficient to assume that only
some of Avans’s allegations were in fact true, as the district court
found. The court held “that Avans was the subject of domestic abuse
from time to time by the Petitioner and that what she alleges, in the
156
This included a finding that “[a]t times, he
main, is plausible.”
157
While it is not exactly clear which
resorted to using force.”
allegations the district court found substantiated, one is left with a
considerable amount of violence if one assumes the truth of only
some of the allegations made at the initial hearing and reiterated at
158
the remand hearing.
It is important to note that the court never
rejected Avans’s testimony regarding police inaction and did not find
159
that the police would act any differently if she returned.
Assuming these facts, the concept of “intolerable situation,” as
160
defined by the Swiss, could have led the district court to rule
differently. The first criterion is that “placement with the parent who
161
filed the application is manifestly not in the child’s best interests.”
The district court’s decision suggests that it would have found this
criterion satisfied. After all, the district court approved of the
arrangement whereby the child would enter foster care upon her
162
Judge Walls probably recognized that the
return to Argentina.
mother’s child abuse allegations might be true, despite her inability
to meet the high burden of proof (clear and convincing evidence).
After all, the only expert called in the case said that she needed more
163
time to determine whether the child had been sexually abused.
Even if the father’s alleged abuse had been directed solely at the
mother and not the child, the first prong of the Swiss law would have
been satisfied. It is detrimental for a child to be in the custody of a
domestic violence perpetrator. Congress has said, “[F]or purposes of
determining child custody, credible evidence of physical abuse of a
156. Adan, 2007 WL 1850910, at *11.
157. Id.
158. This approach seems justified given that the judge thought the mother was “a
little more credible” than the father in the first hearing and that the father “lied or
was not being truthful when he denied that he had ever verbally threatened [Avans]
or abused her, if we use that term in the context of verbal abuse.” In re Adan, 437
F.3d at 387.
159. Id. at 397.
160. See supra text accompanying note 41 (outlining the Swiss law for describing
an intolerable situation).
161. Id.
162. See Adan, 2007 WL 1850910, at *14 (explaining the Argentinean judge “made
clear” that Arianna would become a ward of the state until a full hearing was
conducted).
163. See id. at *10 (commenting that “Dr. Borjas was unable to offer a professional
opinion” as to whether the child had been sexually abused but “indicated that
further study would be necessary”).
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spouse should create a statutory presumption that it is detrimental to
164
The
the child to be placed in the custody of the abusive spouse.”
American Bar Association (“ABA”) recommends that “where there is
proof of abuse, batterers should be presumed by law to be unfit
165
custodians for their children.”
The facts of Adan v. Avans also satisfied the second Swiss
166
criterion.
Avans “[was] not, given all of the circumstances, in a
position to take care of the child in the State where the child was
habitually resident immediately before the abduction or . . . this
167
Avans’s
[could] not reasonably be required from this parent.”
unrefuted testimony about her inability to get police protection in
Argentina would make it both unfair and unwise to expect her to
168
return to Argentina.
Finally, it manifestly would not be in Arianna’s best interest to be
placed in foster care. Being placed in foster care pending a custody
determination is a confusing and unsettling experience for a young
169
child.
From the child’s perspective, foster care means separation
from a loving parent, and that is very difficult. Even children who are
removed to family foster care because of serious abuse or neglect
almost uniformly describe missing their families: “56% reported that
164. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SENSE OF RESPECTING CHILD CUSTODY
DETERMINATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 101-737 (Sept. 21, 1990); see also Merle H. Weiner,
The Potential and Challenge of Transnational Litigation for Feminists Concerned About
Domestic Violence Here and Abroad, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 751–52
(2003) (listing laws and law reform efforts that acknowledge the connection between
domestic violence and custody, visitation, and related determinations).
165. HOWARD DAVIDSON, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
CHILDREN: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 13 (1994).
The ABA report identifies three characteristics of unfit custodians in this context:
First, the abuser has ignored the child’s interests by harming the child’s
other parent. Second, the pattern of control and domination common to
abusers often continues after the physical separation of the abuser and
victim. Third, abusers are highly likely to use children in their care, or
attempt to gain custody of their children, as a means of controlling their
former spouse or partner.
Id.
166. See supra text accompanying note 41 (setting forth the criteria that define an
“intolerable situation” under the Swiss Act).
167. Id.
168. See In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 397 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that Adan did
not contest Avans’s testimony related to the failure of Argentinean police officers to
provide her any assistance, and noting that the district court did not discount Avans’s
testimony).
169. Cf. Peggy D. Dallmann, Comment, The Hague Convention on Parental Child
Abduction: An Analysis of Emerging Trends in Enforcement by U.S. Courts, 5 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 171, 197 n.160 (1994) (“Ordering the child back to another country to
be placed in a third party’s hands (which could be either a foster home or some type
of foster-care institution) would only result in even more disruption in the short life
of a young child, especially where the court has good reason to believe that the child
has already experienced an emotionally traumatic family life.”).
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170

Foster care,
they miss their parents most of the time.”
consequently, can both precipitate and exacerbate behavioral and
emotional problems.
When a child has a loving, non-abusive parent as the caregiver,
foster care is also an inferior option because the new family is of an
unknown quality. One study found that 13% of foster parents were
171
ranked as “barely adequate.” Another study found that 25% of the
172
children were “physically punished severely” while in foster care. A
study that reviewed many of the studies concluded,
[T]here is reason to believe that a proportion of approved foster
parents and families (approximately 15–20%) have problems in
their home environment, family functioning and parenting. . .
.[I]n several key areas—parental mental health, marital conflict,
social support, and temperament—we simply do not know what, if
any, proportion of foster parents have significant limitations.173
174

It is well known that foster care placement is often not stable, and
this presents yet another reason why it is manifestly not in a child’s
best interest to be placed there when a loving, non-abusive parent is
available instead. Even children who come into foster care without
behavioral problems may be negatively affected by switching
175
Admittedly, most custody adjudications are not
placements.
supposed to drag on for years, and the horror stories about foster
care are generally referencing long-term foster care. Children’s time
in care, in fact, may be reduced if a country has expedited
176
procedures for provisional measures.
Yet the Wood case is a
170. Penny Ruff Johnson et al., Family Foster Care Placement: The Child’s Perspective,
74 CHILD WELFARE 959, 967 (1995).
171. Isabel Dando & Brian Minty, What Makes Good Foster Parents?, 17 BRIT. J. SOC.
WORK 385, 389 (1987).
172. See DAVID FANSHEL ET AL., FOSTER CHILDREN IN A LIFE COURSE PERSPECTIVE 91
(1990) (reporting data from an interview study that asked foster children about their
experience in the Casey Family Living Program).
173. John G. Orme & Cheryl Buerhler, Foster Family Characteristics and Behavioural
and Emotional Problems of Foster Children: A Narrative Review, 50 FAM. REL. 3, 12 (2001).
174. See Sigrid James, Why Do Foster Care Placements Disrupt? An Investigation of
Reasons for Placement Change in Foster Care, 78 SOC. SERV. REV. 601, 605–06 (2004)
(concluding that the average number of placement changes for foster children over
an eighteen month period was 3.6, but noting some children in the study changed
placement as many as fifteen times over the eighteen month period).
175. See Rae R. Newton et al., Children and Youth in Foster Care: Disentangling the
Relationship Between Problem Behaviours and Number in Placements, 24 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 1363, 1372 (2000). But see Orme & Buerhler, supra note 173, at 3 (arguing
that “the link between foster care placement and child problem behaviours is not
well established, and the causal direction of this relationship is unclear”); id. at 12
(bemoaning the “startling” lack of research that exists on foster family characteristics
and the behavioural and emotional problems of foster children).
176. See, e.g., Re O (Child Abduction: Undertakings), (1994) 2 Fam. 349, 362
(U.K.) (noting that a custody contest can take eighteen months to two years to
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reminder that foster care instability can occur even for children
177
awaiting a custody adjudication. Custody cases can be significantly
delayed for a variety of reasons, including court calendars, the
unavailability of court services (such as custody evaluators), and the
178
parties themselves.
One study indicated that it took, on average,
eighteen to twenty-two months to complete a contested custody
179
dispute in three Colorado counties. Even if a custody case proceeds
quickly, so that the children only need short-term foster care,
placement instability can occur. Placement changes occur for a wide
variety of reasons, including for reasons that have nothing to do with
the child. Interruptions are caused by administrative rules (e.g., strict
time limits for short-time placements, such as thirty days) and foster
family particularities (e.g., the foster family relocates, goes on
180
vacation, or has a life emergency and can no longer provide care).
It is impossible to predict whether the district court would have
found an “intolerable situation” in Adan v. Avans if it had followed
181
the Swiss approach.
However, it certainly might have made a
difference because the Swiss approach was meant for just such a case.
The Swiss formulation would have helped guide the court to the
conclusion that returning Arianna would pose a grave risk that she
would be placed in an intolerable situation. Likewise, the Swiss
formulation should assist other courts in their assessment of whether
a situation is “intolerable,” and thereby potentially change the results
for some respondents and children whose cases evoke our sympathy.

complete, with appeals, but emergency procedures exist to obtain a provisional order
and that can be heard within one or two months); Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra
note 22, ¶ 167 (quoting Chair who believed that the Special Commission recognized
that children’s interests “may be affected in those cases where there was likely to be a
long delay in the habitual residence country before the custody proceedings were
heard”).
177. See Legislative Assembly-Grievance, supra note 12 (noting the children were
kept away from their parents for nineteen months, with no contact with their father,
and transferred between six different foster homes during that period).
178. See id. (referring to the procedures in the Wood case that delayed the progress
of the custody adjudication).
179. See Jessica Pearson & Maria A. Luchesi Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in
Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 712–13 (1982) (examining contested
custody cases in Denver, Jefferson, and Adams counties, from 1973 to 1978).
180. See James, supra note 174, at 619–20 (finding that within an eighteen month
period, 580 foster children averaged around three placement changes, with a range
of 0 to 15).
181. The trial court’s general hostility to the mother and her allegations—and its
disregard of the Third Circuit’s guidance—suggests that the mother may have lost
even with this argument. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
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Are There Reasons to Reject the Swiss Understanding of
“Intolerable Situation”?

Some may oppose this Article’s call for courts in the United States
to follow Switzerland’s example. Critics may worry about the
invigoration of the “intolerable situation” defense generally, and
about the permissiveness of the provisions in the Swiss statute. On
the other hand, some critics may worry that the Swiss law risks
restricting the defense unnecessarily. On balance, the Swiss proposal
appears appropriate, although the criteria must not be interpreted
too broadly nor deemed essential prerequisites to the defense’s
success.
1.

The risk of creating a loophole
Fearmongers who oppose invocation of the “grave risk of harm”
defense will undoubtedly claim that the use of “intolerable situation”
will spell doom for the Convention, creating a loophole too large to
fix. These critics would prefer to maintain the status quo, where
courts and parties largely ignore the separate meaning of “intolerable
situation.”
Ignoring the defense, however, is unacceptable from a separation
of powers perspective. The words are meant to be invoked in an
appropriate situation, and the only question is whether a situation
qualifies. A court that ignores the defense, or subsumes it under the
“physical or psychological harm” defense, unjustifiably disregards the
182
intent of the Convention’s drafters and Congress.
The “intolerable situation” provision should not become a
loophole because the “grave risk of harm” defense has not become
one. Contracting states have managed to keep the interpretation of
183
that provision narrow.
Courts should be similarly vigilant in
policing the application of the “intolerable situation” defense. They
should not find an “intolerable situation” when the facts establish no
more than the situations identified in the State Department report as
insufficient: a home where money is in short supply, or more limited
184
educational or other opportunities in the habitual residence. Yet a
significant difference exists between those situations and a situation

182. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) incorporates the
exceptions set forth in Article 13(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A) (2006); see also
supra notes 32–36.
183. See Conclusions and Recommendations of the Fifth Meeting, supra note 38, § 1.4.2
(noting that the courts in contracting states have rejected few applications based on
an Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” defense).
184. Legal Analysis, supra note 51, at 10510.
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in which a child will be taken from a loving parent and placed in
institutional care for the sole purpose of litigating a custody dispute
in a particular jurisdiction. For cases that fall outside of these
recognized parameters for the defense, judges should be guided by
the admonition that the defense is to be narrowly interpreted and the
185
child’s situation must evoke an objective sense of intolerability. In
addition, when respondents invoke the Swiss formulation in
particular, judges should ensure that the respondent satisfies all of
the prongs of the Swiss proposal—and by clear and convincing
186
evidence —so that the Swiss formulation itself does not become a
loophole.
2.

The appropriateness of the underlying criteria
It is worth examining each of the prongs of the Swiss law to see
whether any one of them poses a particular risk to the Convention’s
operation. The discussion below concludes that the particular
criteria in the Swiss statute are not themselves problematic.
a.

First criterion

The first criterion requires an evaluation of whether placement
with the left-behind parent is “manifestly not in the child’s best
187
Some may be concerned that this criterion integrates a
interest.”
best interest inquiry into the analysis. At first blush, the criterion
appears to require a merits determination, something that courts
188
adjudicating Hague petitions are supposed to avoid.
Yet the Swiss approach is not akin to a merits determination
because it contains the word “manifestly.” A requirement that
placement with a parent be “manifestly not in the child’s best
interest” creates a high hurdle for the respondent to surmount.
Therefore, this first criterion requires a much different analysis than
the comparative exercise of deciding which parent is a better
custodian for the child. The defense focuses the court solely on the
185. See supra text accompanying notes 75–80.
186. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A)
(2006) (requiring that the respondent establish the Article 13(b) or Article 20
exception by clear and convincing evidence).
187. See Swiss Federal Act art. 5(a), Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 36
(2008), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher,
supra note 2, at 162.
188. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 16 (“[T]he judicial or
administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been
removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of
custody until it has determined that the child is not to be returned under this
Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a
reasonable time following receipt of the notice.”).
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petitioner, and the court must find a significant concern that affects
that parent’s fitness. As Professor Bucher, one of the drafters of the
Swiss Act, stated, “[a] certain amount of strictness is imperative so as
189
Courts already
not to transform the dispute into a custody case.”
engage in a similar sort of examination when they apply the “grave
risk of harm” provision of Article 13. In fact, whenever a court finds
that the left-behind parent poses a grave risk of physical or
psychological harm to the child, this first criterion would be
established, although a grave risk of harm would not be necessary to
meet this criterion. For example, it would be sufficient if the
petitioner did not want custody but was only seeking the child’s
return to obtain or effectuate access rights. These facts could be
discovered with a few questions. The first criterion would also be
satisfied if the petitioner were a domestic violence perpetrator, even
if the court found that none of the violence had been directed
190
These
toward the child or that the violence had been sporadic.
facts will typically be in the record already if the respondent raised a
“grave risk of harm” defense.
b.

Second criterion

The second criterion will probably also generate debate. Its
191
formulation is fairly broad, and Professor Bucher envisions a wide
192
interpretation of the provision. Not only would an abductor not be
expected to return if her safety were at risk or she were subject to
193
criminal prosecution, but the provision would also cover situations
in which the abductor has good reasons to remain in the abducted-to
194
forum, such as a new marriage or caring for a sick family member.
It would apply whenever the habitual residence is not “reasonably
bearable” for the parent because “the problems and psychological
burden felt by the abducting parent upon return also affect the child
195
and endanger his personal well-being.”
It would also be unreasonable to expect the abductor to return
when the left-behind parent only seeks to maintain or establish
visitation, and not custody, so long as the left-behind parent could
189. Bucher, supra note 2, at 158.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 165–166.
191. See supra text accompanying note 41.
192. See Bucher, supra note 2, at 159, 161.
193. Cf. Re M (Abduction: Child’s Objections), [2007] EWCA (Civ) 260, at ¶ 92
(Eng.) (Wilson, L.J., concurring) (commenting in obiter dictum that efforts by Serbia
to imprison abductor for drugs that were planted on her might qualify for the
“intolerable situation” defense given the child’s fear for her mother’s safety).
194. See Bucher, supra note 12, at 158.
195. Id. at 159–60.

2008] INTOLERABLE SITUATIONS AND COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN

373

196

One can imagine a
obtain visitation in the abducted-to country.
number of other reasonable bases for the abductor’s unwillingness to
return. For example, the parent might lack resources to litigate
custody in the child’s habitual residence, but might qualify for legal
aid in the abducted-to country. In short, the second criterion may
cover a wide variety of situations where the abductor could not, or
need not, return.
It may seem inconsistent with the Convention to permit the
defense in some of the situations described immediately above.
Imagine, for example, a primary caretaker who claims she should not
be expected to return because she has a new spouse in the abductedto country, and the court in the child’s habitual residence would not
permit her to relocate. Justice Singer, for one, concluded that the
inability to relocate would not constitute an “intolerable situation,”
197
unless that were categorically true for all abductors. He believed a
contrary conclusion would “thwart the object of the Convention that
the courts of the country of a child’s habitual residence should be the
198
forum where decisions concerning him are taken.”
Although the second criterion is broad, its breadth must be kept in
context. The second criterion is one of three criteria, and all three
criteria must be satisfied to establish an “intolerable situation.”
Unless placement of the child with the other parent is manifestly not
in the child’s best interest and the child will be placed in foster care
(or, perhaps, some other placement that is substandard when
compared to the primary caregiver’s care), the defense will not
199
It is also useful to recall the function of the intolerable
apply.
situation defense. The defense gives courts some flexibility to avoid
morally intolerable outcomes when deciding whether litigation
196. See id. at 160; Working Doc. No. 1E, supra note 20, at 2.
197. Re O (Child Abduction: Undertakings), (1994) 2 Fam. 349, 356 (U.K.).
198. See id. at 356 (explaining that an inability to relocate— even if it caused the
mother to be upset so as to seriously affect her ability to care for the children—would
not be an “intolerable situation,” although an embargo on the removal of children
from the country might be); see also P v. P (Minors) (Child Abduction), (1992) 1
Fam. 155, 161 (U.K.) (rejecting defense when it rested on the fact that returning the
children would cause the mother to return and she would become “a deeply
unhappy person” and that “[a]n unhappy mother means unhappy children”); In re M
(Abduction: Undertakings), (1995) 1 Fam. 1021, 1027 (C.A.) (U.K.) (finding that a
ne exeat clause was not an intolerable condition because the mother could seek its
modification). At least one commentator has said the same even for situations in
which the petitioner only has rights of visitation coupled with a ne exeat clause. See
Kathleen A. O’Connor, What Gives You the Right!?—Ne Exeat Rights Should Constitute
Rights of Custody After Furnes v. Reeves, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 449, 472 (2005).
199. See Swiss Federal Act art. 5, Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 36
(2008), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher,
supra note 2, at 162.
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should occur in a particular forum. After all, the Pérez-Vera Report
says the Convention’s remedy “gives way before the primary interest
of any person in not being exposed to physical or psychological
200
danger or being placed in an intolerable situation.” Courts should
avoid placing a child in an intolerable situation, even if the abductor
receives some incidental benefit from the court’s decision.
To be clear, the adoption of the Swiss formulation would not mean
that custodial parents have carte blanche to disregard relocation
restrictions and ne exeat clauses; the defense will not always succeed
because respondents may lack facts to support the other criteria.
Even if the “intolerable situation” defense were to succeed, the court
in the habitual residence could still sanction the custodial parent for
201
In addition, a judge adjudicating
contempt of its court order.
custody in the requested state should certainly consider, and address
appropriately, the abductor’s initial actions. That court, for example,
may decide that the fact of the abduction itself matters to its custody
decision, even if the abductor’s reasons for refusing to return to the
child’s habitual residence are reasonable for purposes of the
“intolerable situation” defense. The abductor’s reasons for the
abduction may have been unjustified, showing the party to be
insensitive to the child’s needs and interests. The court that
adjudicates custody and access will be able to examine thoroughly all
of the allegations and do what is best for the child.
c.

Third criterion

The third criterion requires that “foster care” manifestly not be in
the child’s best interest. The term “foster care” should be interpreted
to reflect the purpose of the defense. For example, “foster care”
202
should not cover an arrangement like in Re S, a case in which a
young girl was being returned to her mother and they were both to
203
live together in an analysis home in Sweden.
An analysis home is
200. Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, supra note 59, at 433, ¶ 29.
201. In most cases, it would be improper, in my opinion, for the authorities in the
requested state to file criminal charges and extradite the abductor after an Article
13(b) defense has been established. Unfortunately, the U.S. State Department
recently sought the extradition of an abductor who claimed she fled to Costa Rica
from the U.S. for safety reasons, but the request was denied after the woman
obtained asylum from Costa Rica for her experiences with domestic violence in the
United States. See Gillian Gillers, U.S. Citizen, Wanted by Uncle Sam, Freed from Jail, TICO
TIMES, July 29, 2008, available at http://www.ticotimes.net/dailyarchive/
2008_07/072808.htm#story1.
202. See Re S (Abduction: Return into Care), (1999) 1 Fam. 843 (U.K.).
203. See id. (describing that the mother and child were to “be placed in an
investigation home for assessment” so that Swedish authorities could assess whether
the mother’s cohabitee made sexual advances toward her child, as alleged).
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204

“arranged like a normal home,” but gives the social services staff the
opportunity to investigate thoroughly the situation, including “the
205
mother’s ability and qualifications to care for the child[,]” while
206
also protecting the child against the risk of further abuse.
This
arrangement was proposed in Re S because the mother’s husband
207
allegedly had sexually abused the child, thereby prompting the
father to abduct the child. On the other hand, “foster care” might
cover a situation in which the child was being returned to a
placement akin to foster care, although it had a different name or
208
structure. The defense is meant to protect against the separation of
a child from the child’s primary caregiver during the pendency of the
custody adjudication when it is manifestly not in the child’s best
interest to be with the other parent and when the nature of any third
party placement is inferior to the abductor’s care.
3.

The risk of limiting the “intolerable situation” defense
The final concern about the Swiss criterion is of a different type,
and requires little ink to address. Some may worry that the Swiss
formulation is too limited. After all, under the Swiss formulation, it
would not be an “intolerable situation” to return a three-year-old
child to a fit parent who had rights of custody solely by virtue of a
statutory ne exeat clause even if (1) the child had been abducted
almost immediately after birth so that the child and left-behind
parent were strangers, (2) the abductor refused to return with the
204. Id. at 845.
205. Id. at 846.
206. Id. at 843.
207. It appeared that the mother had since separated from her husband, and he
would not be living in the home. See id. (noting that the mother had a new
cohabitant).
208. Cf. Ontario Ct. v. M and M (Abduction: Children’s Objections), (1997) 1
Fam. 475 (U.K.). In M and M, the Ontario court was seeking the return of children
for whom custody and access proceedings had been instituted by the grandmother.
Id. The children had been removed to England by their parents pending the court’s
decision. Id. The English court rejected the Hague application, finding that there
was a grave risk of an “intolerable situation” if the older child were returned. Id. at
485. The father could not return with the child because the father had been
deported; the mother could return with the child but would be left homeless and
without money in Canada; and the older child, a nine-year-old, felt very strongly that
she did not want to leave her parents and her settled life in England. Id.
The defense might also apply in a situation like that described in the Collated
Reponses. Apparently a court in the Netherlands granted an Article 13(b) defense
because the mother could not obtain permission to live in the state of habitual
residence and the court was concerned that the father could not care for the child
alone. See Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 3 Nov. 2005, LJN: AV0718 (Neth.), in Collated
Responses, supra note 88, at 205 (explaining that returning the child to the father
would not have been in the best interests of the child and that a return would likely
pose a grave risk to the child).
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child because of new family obligations, a fear of criminal
prosecution, and an inability to support herself or her child in the
other country, and (3) the courts in the child’s habitual residence
would deny the abductor permission to relocate. In this hypothetical,
a court adjudicating the return of the child might believe that foster
care is unnecessary and, therefore, the third criteria would not be
met. The inability to satisfy the Swiss formulation might inhibit the
court from granting the “intolerable situation” defense, even though
the court might still perceive return to be an “intolerable situation”
for the child. Without deciding whether the “intolerable situation”
defense should apply in such a case, it seems as if this fact pattern
might be dealt with through other means: the Article 12 well-settled
209
210
defense, the Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” defense, a refusal
211
to equate a ne exeat clause with rights of custody, or by encouraging
nations to adopt permissive relocation policies. To the extent that
these other options were unavailing, the Swiss proposal does not
foreclose the application of the “intolerable situation” defense
because the Swiss criteria are not the exclusive method for
212
establishing an “intolerable situation.”
III. COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
The Swiss legislation is also admirable because it directs courts to
appoint counsel for children when their parents are parties to a
Hague Convention proceeding. Switzerland’s automatic rule has the
advantage of eliminating parents’ and courts’ discretion on this
issue—a discretion that has caused inequities in the protection of
children’s interests. In fact, Switzerland required that counsel be
appointed in all cases because it found that judges were rarely
exercising their authority and appointing representatives for children

209. See, e.g., Van Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848, 852
(S.D. Tex. 2006) (finding child was well-settled; the fact that the respondent was
potentially subject to criminal prosecution in the requesting country suggested that
the court should not apply equitable tolling provision, but should grant the defense).
210. See Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2001) (suggesting that a
court may consider the fact that a child is settled as part of an analysis of “grave risk
of harm”).
211. See supra text accompanying note 31 (describing how courts in the United
States are split on whether rights of visitation coupled with a ne exeat clause create
custody rights entitling the holder to a remedy of return).
212. In fact, courts around the globe have sometimes interpreted “intolerable
situation” differently than the Swiss law. See supra text accompanying notes 88 and
89. The types of decisions discussed in notes 61–64, 88, 89, 98, and 193 would be
unaffected by the Swiss interpretation of “intolerable situation.”
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in divorce proceedings, and the drafters had a commitment to
213
ensuring that every child in a Hague proceeding have counsel.
Courts in the United States sometimes appoint guardians ad litem,
214
counsel, or both for children in Hague cases, but many courts do
not. Federal courts have the authority to appoint representatives for
215
children by virtue of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
216
perhaps by the state law of the jurisdiction in which they sit. State
217
courts have found authority in their own state law provisions.
However, most parents fail to ask courts to appoint counsel for the
child (although courts may have the authority, or even the
218
219
obligation, to appoint representatives sua sponte ). Nor do courts
213. See Bucher, supra note 2, at 150 (noting that Article 9(3) is innovative because
it makes it “compulsory for the judge to designate a representative who acts as
custodian for the child”). The lack of appointed counsel for children in divorce
proceedings appears to be an issue in many European countries. See Branka Resetar
& Robert E. Emery, Children’s Rights in European Legal Proceedings: Why Are Family
Practices So Different From Legal Theories?, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 65, 73 (2008) (noting that
children participate in custody proceedings in less than five percent of cases in Italy
and Croatia).
214. Some courts adjudicating Hague petitions appoint a guardian ad litem:
Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002); Lieberman v. Tabachnik, No. 07CV-02415-WYD, 2007 WL 4548570 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2007); McManus v. McManus,
354 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D. Mass. 2005); Olguin v. Santana, No. 03 CV 6299(JG), 2004
WL 1752444 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2004). Some courts appoint an attorney who acts in
the dual role of both the guardian ad litem and the child attorney: Kufner v. Kufner,
519 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2008); Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548,
2007 WL 1461794, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2007). In divorce and custody
proceedings, courts sometimes appoint two individuals, both a guardian ad litem and
an attorney for the children: Schult v. Schult, 699 A.2d 134, 135 (Conn. 1997);
Schain v. Schain, No. FA000156786S, 2002 WL 450387, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb.
26, 2002).
215. See Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2008) (using Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(c) as authority in a Hague Abduction Convention case); see also
infra note 218 (describing Rule 17).
216. See, e.g., Wasniewski, 2007 WL 1461794, at *2 (using Ohio Juv. R. 4(B)(2),(8)
as authority).
217. See Wittman v. Wittman, No. FA0740006469S, 2007 WL 826536, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2007) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-54(a) (2004)). A court’s
inherent authority to protect the interests of minors would presumably also be of
use. See generally 43 C.J.S. Infants § 329 (2008) (citing cases in Arizona courts, New
York courts, and the Tenth Circuit where the trial court relied on its inherent
authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for a child).
218. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c) (“The court must appoint a guardian ad litem—or
issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent person who is
unrepresented in an action.”); cf. Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir.
1958) (reversing and remanding case because trial judge did not consider sua sponte
whether minors should have a guardian ad litem appointed). The court’s decision to
replace the child’s representative, who is frequently the parent, would be reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. See Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that while the court has discretion, “the court should usually appoint
a guardian ad litem” when it appears that the minor’s general representative has
interests that may conflict with the minor’s) (citations omitted).
219. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children reports that federal
court judges, in particular, are particularly “inclined to grant a motion to appoint a
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receive many requests from third parties because few professionals
220
participate in Hague proceedings (compared to custody cases).
221
Even when requests are made, some courts reject them.
A. The Case for Appointing Counsel for Children
If the decision to appoint counsel for children in Hague cases
turned solely on whether children had interests affected by the
proceedings, children would be appointed counsel in every case.
Hague proceedings are very important to the children whose
transnational movement prompted the legal proceedings. Just like
the abduction itself, the proceedings can have a profound impact on
children’s lives. The child may welcome the proceeding because the
child wants to return to a loving left-behind parent. Alternatively, the
Hague proceeding may return a child to a country the child abhors,
separate the child from his or her primary caregiver, or expose the
child to a left-behind parent who has harmed or will harm the child.
A return order may put the child’s physical and legal custody in a
state of limbo or upset the child’s settled physical environment,
causing the child considerable anxiety. The proceeding may leave
the primary caregiver who abducted her child anxious and depressed
as she decides whether to return with the child, and the child may
witness, and be affected by, her anxiety. In addition, the child may
experience the proceeding as frightening if the child is uncertain
about what to expect, or alienating if the court does not listen to the
child. Alternatively, the child may feel that he or she has been thrust
into the middle of a dispute that the child would prefer to ignore.
guardian ad litem or to sua sponte seek the advice of someone who is not beholden to
either parent.” NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN & KILPATRICK
STOCKTON LLP, LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES UNDER THE
HAGUE CONVENTION 70 (2007), available at http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/
training_manual/NCMEC_Training_Manual.pdf
[hereinafter
LITIGATING
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES]; cf. Karen Prosek, The Family Court’s
Expectations of Child’s Counsel, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 203, 206 (2007) (reporting
that about seventy percent of the discretionary counsel appointments for children in
Family Court are done sua sponte by the court).
220. For example, under some rules, mediators for the parties can suggest that a
representative should be appointed for the child. See, e.g., S.F. County Superior Ct.
Rules, Rule 11.7(C)(2)(a)(3) (July 2008), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/
courts_page.asp?id=85541 (“The mediator may recommend that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent any child involved in a custody or visitation proceeding.”).
Mediation is not as common in Hague proceedings as it is in family law matters
generally, at least not yet.
221. See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, No. 08-690, 2008 WL 2217608, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Pa.
May 27, 2008) (finding no authority in state law for an appointment in a Hague
case); Hasan v. Hasan, No. 03-11960-GAO, 2004 WL 57073, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 13,
2004) (claiming an appointment would lead the court to litigate the children’s best
interests, something prohibited by the Convention).

2008] INTOLERABLE SITUATIONS AND COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN

379

1.

Potential conflicts of interest
Although the child has a tremendous interest in the process as well
as the outcome of the Hague proceeding, courts probably do not
appoint counsel for children in Hague proceedings when asked, or
when they themselves think of it, for the same reason counsel are
often not appointed for children in custody disputes. There is an
assumption that the parents can adequately represent their children’s
222
interests.
This assumption makes sense in the vast majority of
custody cases because the court is trying to determine the child’s best
interest and both parents are helping to inform the court’s decision
on what is best for the child. Yet this reasoning makes little sense in
the context of a Hague proceeding. A Hague case differs from a
custody case in that a Hague proceeding does not adjudicate the
child’s best interests. Consequently, neither parent will necessarily be
focused on the child’s best interest, nor will the court. That reality
makes a representative for the child imperative because there is a
great chance that the parents’ positions will conflict with the child’s
223
interests.
A simple example illustrates this point. Imagine that a left-behind
parent seeks a fourteen-year-old child’s return, and the abductor
seeks to block return by relying on the “well-settled” defense in
224
Article 12 and the age and maturity defense in Article 13. Assume

222. See, e.g., Nancy Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1821 (1996) (“[I]t is not uncommon for courts to assume that
the child’s interests [in proceedings such as custody] will adequately be protected
either by another party to the proceeding or by the court itself.”) (citations omitted);
Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem in Custody or
Visitation Proceedings (With Commentary), 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 1, 2–3 (1995)
[hereinafter Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys] (“In the absence of a
particular reason for assigning representation for a child, the representative
frequently will merely duplicate the efforts of counsel already appearing in the
case.”); see also C.W. v. K.A.W., 774 A.2d 745, 748 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (“Since
both parties and the trial court are focused on the child’s best interests, it appears
that the appointment of a guardian ad litem would not be proper absent
extraordinary circumstances . . . .”).
223. See Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548, 2007 WL 1461794, at
*2 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2007) (appointing an attorney who would also serve as both
the child’s guardian ad litem and attorney in Hague Convention proceeding because
the child’s “interests may conflict with those of his parents and [the appointment]
may be necessary to afford him and his family a fair hearing”); Rhona Schuz, The
Hague Child Abduction Convention and Children’s Rights, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 393, 430 (2002) (“[If] the test is whether the case belongs to a category in
which there is a potential for a conflict between the interests of the child and his
parents, separate representation should be ordered in nearly all abduction cases.”).
224. Article 12 states, in relevant part: “The judicial or administrative authority,
even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the
period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the
return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new
environment.” Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 12.

380

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:335

that the child wants to remain with the abductor in the requested
state, but prefers not to have her views expressed to the court. She
fears that sharing her view will harm her relationship with the leftbehind parent. In addition, the child does not want her therapist’s
records revealed to either parent, although the abductor seeks to use
them to help establish that the child is well-settled, and the leftbehind parent wants to use them to demonstrate that the abductor
225
has unduly influenced the child’s opinion. This scenario illustrates
that the child’s interests may not be represented by either parent,
and may in fact conflict with both parents’ interests.
Practical differences between a custody contest and a Hague
proceeding also make it more likely that the child’s interests will be
ignored or misrepresented in a Hague proceeding. The assumption
226
underlying the Convention is that abduction harms children.
Yet
the parent whose views are theoretically aligned with the child’s
interests has little or no contact with the child. The abduction takes
the child away from that parent. Therefore, as a practical matter, it is
the abductor who is responsible for representing the child’s interests,
but presumptively their interests are not aligned. The abductor wants
to defeat the return petition, but the Convention presumes that
children should be returned. Even if a particular defense exists (e.g.,
the well-settled defense), the child may have a strong desire to return
to the habitual residence. It is unlikely that such information will be
presented to the court if the child is not represented, as the leftbehind parent may not even know the relevant facts. Even where the
abductor’s and child’s interests are perfectly aligned, the respondent
227
herself may be unrepresented, which will weaken the presentation
225. See In re Berg, 886 A.2d 980, 986–87 (N.H. 2005) (holding that children had a
right to assert a therapist-client privilege with regard to therapist notes that father
sought in visitation dispute and stating “[t]he weight of authority in other
jurisdictions supports protection for the therapy records of children who are at the
center of a custody dispute or whose interests may be in conflict with those of their
natural guardians”); Attorney ad Litem for D.K. v. Parents of D.K, 780 So. 2d 301,
307–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the child had a privilege that the
child could assert and that the parents could not waive). It is worth mentioning that
counsel may be able to negotiate solutions to such evidentiary conflicts. For
example, Gary Melton has suggested, in the context of health services, that the
child’s participation may help the parties negotiate a way to release the clinician’s
records, but with certain exceptions that the parties may agree upon in advance. See
Gary Melton, Parents and Children: Legal Reform to Facilitate Children’s Participation,
AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST, Nov. 1999, p. 935, 940.
226. See Pérez-Vera, Report of the Special Commission, supra note 59, at 182
(discussing the Conclusions of the Special Commission of March 1979 and stating
that “abduction of children is contrary to their interests and welfare”) (citation
omitted).
227. See, e.g., Grijalva v. Escayola, No. 2:06-cv-569-FtM-29DNF, 2006 WL 3827539, at
*4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2006) (respondent appeared pro se and “there [was] no
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of the child’s perspective. Even if the abductor is represented, a
court may discount the child’s views and assume the position is “not
authentically the child’s own” because it is presented through the
228
Nor are experts regularly
attorney for the abducting parent.
brought in to give the court an unbiased perspective of the child’s
interests apart from the parents’ positions, unlike high-conflict
custody cases that often involve custody evaluators. This reality makes
the child’s need for a representative more pressing.
The possible conflicts exist not just at the time of the adjudication,
but also at the time the return order is enforced. Imagine, for
example, that the court has ordered the child’s return, but the child
absolutely refuses to get on the plane for the return trip. Imagine
further that the left-behind parent has asked the police to execute
the order, and the police are ready to do so with force. The
respondent may sympathize with the child but may not bring the
child’s situation to the court’s attention, especially if she thinks that
229
she will be blamed for undermining the child’s return. These sorts
of possibilities suggest that children should have counsel in Hague
proceedings.
Another way of thinking about the wisdom of counsel in these
cases is to recognize that child abduction cases are high-conflict
custody cases, even though the issue of custody is not being litigated.
The need for children to have counsel in high-conflict custody cases
230
In these cases, parents may be so focused on
is well recognized.
their own objectives (which can include, for example, punishing the

evidence as to the wishes of the children”); In re Nicholson, No. 97-1273-JTM, 1997
WL 446432, at *4 (D. Kan. July 7, 1997) (respondent appeared pro se and court
determined the child did “not raise any substantial objection to returning to
Germany”). In In re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51,
[2007] 1 A.C. 619 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), Baroness Hale suggested
that the abductor may not be receiving a fair trial when she lacks an attorney.
228. Cf. In re D, [2007] 1 A.C. at 642 (suggesting the child should be heard in
every Hague case unless it appears inappropriate and “[i]t is plainly not good
enough to say that the abducting parent, with whom the child is living, can present
the child’s view to the court”).
229. See Bruch, supra note 36, at 534 n.20 (discussing Re J).
230. See, e.g., In re Berg, 886 A.2d 980, 985 (N.H. 2005) (“[W]hen custody of the
child becomes the subject of a bitter contest between mother and father, the
personal interests of the contestants in almost all cases obliterate that which is in the
best interests of the child. It is at this point that it can be said that the interests of
both parents become potentially, if not actually, adverse to the child’s interests.”)
(quoting Bond v. Bond, 887 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994)); Am. Bar Assoc.
Section of Family Law, Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Children in Custody
Cases, 37 FAM. L. Q. 131, 153 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Standards of Practice]
(recognizing in part IV.A.2.j that a level of acrimony is a factor a court can weigh in
determining whether to appoint representation for children).
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231

that the child’s interests are not adequately
other parent),
232
The feelings and interests of the parents in Hague
represented.
cases may similarly crowd out attention to the feelings and interests of
the children. In addition, child abduction cases frequently involve
allegations of domestic violence and child abuse, and counsel for the
233
In domestic
minor is recommended for these sorts of cases too.
violence cases, “guardians ad litem . . . help prevent batterers from
234
using children as tools or pawns,” and ensure that evidence of
235
The ABA
domestic violence is brought to the court’s attention.
observes that whenever the case has allegations of “dangers to the
child” there is “an especially compelling need for lawyers to protect
236
Since a great number of Hague
the interests of children.”
respondents allege that return will create a “grave risk of harm” for
the child, Hague cases are particularly appropriate disputes in which
to appoint a representative for the child.
Conflict between the parents’ interests and child’s interests is one
of the primary factors that motivates courts to appoint a
237
A rule requiring the appointment of
representative for a child.
counsel in all Hague cases makes good sense because Hague cases, by
their nature, are ripe for conflicts of interest, and the conflicts are
unlikely to come to courts’ attention. Consequently, a categorical
231. Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It is the “Right” Thing To Do,
27 PACE L. REV. 869, 892, 899 (2007).
232. Id. at 871.
So when should the child’s voice be added to the debate? My answer is
whenever the child’s interests and the parent’s interests are not aligned, or
the same. Most of these instances occur because the parents have lost sight
of the needs of their children for some reason. Three reasons that come
instantly to mind are abuse and neglect situations, domestic violence in the
family, and high conflict custody cases.
Id. at 891.
233. See ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, at 153 (stating that appointment
of counsel may be appropriate in cases of past or present family violence).
234. Honorable Sheila M. Murphy, Guardians Ad Litem: The Guardian Angels of
Our Children in Domestic Violence Court, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 281, 287 (1999).
235. Id. at 288.
236. ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, at 152.
237. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 205 F.R.D. 92, 100-01 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(appointing an attorney as a guardian for children in civil rights action brought by
their mothers, alleged domestic violence victims, against agency for removal of the
children; a “potential for conflict of interest” between the mothers and their children
existed); Ford v. Ford, 216 N.W.2d 176, 177 (Neb. 1974) (approving independent
counsel for children in a divorce proceeding to determine the legitimacy of the
children, reasoning that a decision as to the legitimacy of the children is one in
which the children have vital interests that may be adverse to those of the parents);
see also LOWE, EVERALL & NICHOLS, supra note 49, at 365 (noting “the perceived
inability of or inappropriateness for either parent to represent the children’s view” as
the “common feature” in various Hague cases where counsel was appointed for the
child).
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rule is entirely appropriate for these high-conflict cases and would
save the court the time and expense of individualized assessments.
2.

Other policy justifications
There are at least six other reasons why children in Hague
proceedings should have counsel, apart from guaranteeing that their
238
First, the child’s representative can
interests are accounted for.
help ensure that all of the evidence relevant to an important issue,
like a “grave risk of harm” defense, is brought to the court’s
attention. The child’s representative acts as a fact investigator for the
court, either directly as a guardian ad litem or indirectly as a lawyer for
the child. In one case, for example, the guardian ad litem (an
attorney) reviewed the records of the foreign country’s proceedings
as well as the foreign law and raised concerns about whether contact
between the mother and child would be terminated if the child were
239
returned. An additional fact investigator can be critical because the
parties’ lawyers do not always gather all the relevant facts for whatever

238. There may also be a procedural due process right to counsel, but this Article
does not explore that possibility. Cf. Barbara Atwood, The Voice of the Indian Child:
Strengthening the Indian Child Welfare Act Through Children’s Participation, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 127, 138–39 (2008) (discussing the constitutional right to counsel in abuse and
neglect proceedings under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). Arguably the
same analysis would apply if the court is relying on foster care in the habitual
residence to protect the child. As Atwood states,
Children have profound liberty interests in their own safety, health and wellbeing as well as interests in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and
protecting their family relationships. An erroneous decision to place a child
in foster care will harm the child by the removal itself, the out-of-home living
experience, and the consequent disruption in family relationships.
Id.
239. In re Marriage of Ieronimakis, 831 P.2d 172, 194–95 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992);
see also Lieberman v. Tabachnik, No. 07-cv-02415-WYD, 2007 WL 4548570, at *2 (D.
Colo. Dec. 19, 2007) (appointing a guardian ad litem “to aid [the judge] in
understanding all of the pertinent factors concerning the minor children”). In
Lieberman, the duties of the guardian ad litem included the following:
(1) to investigate all aspects of the social background of each of the minor
children by talking to the Petitioner, Respondent, the minor children,
reviewing court records from legal proceedings in Mexico and engaging in
any further fact inquiry or investigation that the guardian ad litem deems
appropriate; (2) to investigate Respondent’s allegations of abuse,
mistreatment of each of the minor children for the purpose of determining
if Respondent’s allegations are accurate, truthful and verifiable; (3) to
provide facts, evidence and recommendations, as to each child, concerning
whether returning said child to Mexico would expose him or her to a grave
risk of physical or emotional harm or otherwise subject the child to an
intolerable situation; and to investigate the wishes of the children and their
respective maturity levels (to the extent that these issues relate to exceptions
within ICARA) and make appropriate recommendations on this point.
Id.; see Olguin v. Santana, No. 03 CV 6299(JG), 2004 WL 1752444, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 5, 2004) (instructing the guardian ad litem to conduct fact investigation of
various issues).
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reason, and courts do not necessarily ask the parties to obtain the
240
For example, the district court in Adan v. Avans
critical evidence.
chided the respondent, in response to her motion for
reconsideration, for not asking for an independent evaluation of
241
whether the child had experienced child abuse.
A representative
for the child would undoubtedly have done so. Courts even receive
useful information when the child’s representative finds that there is
no useful information to bring to the court’s attention after a diligent
search. In one recent case, the guardian ad litem investigated
allegations of abuse and suggested the allegations lacked evidentiary
242
support.
Apart from fact investigation, the child’s representative
can make appropriate arguments so that the evidence’s relevance is
made manifest. In some cases with allegations of domestic violence,
the abductor never raises the Article 13(b) defense and consequently
243
the allegations have limited legal significance.
The child’s attorney would presumably assist the court through fact
investigation and argument on other aspects of the case too, not just
244
the Article 13(b) defense. Yet it seems particularly essential to have

240. See Nunez v. Ramirez, No. CV 07-01205-PHX-EHC, 2008 WL 898658, at *5 n.5
(D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008) (suspecting that “psychological harm might result” from the
separation of the mother and child, but the mother failed to present evidence on
this point and “the Court’s review of the authorities has not revealed a case in which
a Court, sua sponte, has ordered a psychological examination of the children”). But
see FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (“Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the
motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may
appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert
witnesses of its own selection.”).
241. Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711, at *3 (D.N.J. July 30,
2007), rev’d, In re Adan, 544 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008).
242. Lieberman v. Tabachnik, No. 07-cv-02415-WYD, 2008 WL 1744353, at *3 (D.
Colo. Apr. 10, 2008); see also Robles Antonio v. Barrios Bello, No. Civ.A.1:04-CV-1555T, 2004 WL 1895126, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2004) (relying on report of guardian ad
litem in finding there was no evidence that the petitioner ever abused the child and
recommending that the child be returned to Mexico).
243. See In re B. Del. C.S.B., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185–86 n.1, 4 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(explaining that the mother alleged that the father was physically abusive and was
arrested for domestic violence); Washiewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548,
2007 WL 2462643, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2007) (denying stay pending appeal
and holding it was not error to exclude evidence of alleged child abuse when
allegations are not relevant to age and maturity defense, and respondent never
raised an Article 13(b) defense). In other cases, appellate courts have reprimanded
trial courts for failure to hear from children who were of sufficient age and maturity,
apparently because no one suggested they should be heard. See In re Marriage of
Witherspoon, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586, 594–95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that the ages
of the children and surrounding circumstances suggested the trial court should hear
from the children on remand).
244. See Schuz, supra note 223, at 431–32 (suggesting that an attorney should be
appointed, inter alia: (1) when there is a question as to where the child habitually
resided; (2) when the grave risk of harm exception may apply; (3) where the consent
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a representative for the child in any case where an Article 13(b)
defense is, or should be, raised, simply because the potential harm to
the child of a mistaken ruling is so dire and the likelihood of a
245
Involving
mistake is so great in these expeditious proceedings.
additional lawyers can help get all the evidence gathered in the short
246
time before the hearing.
Second, children need counsel in Hague cases because a
247
The ABA
Convention defense relates to the child’s own views.
recommends appointing a representative for the child whenever the
248
child’s concerns or views are relevant to a custody action. The same
rationale applies in the Hague context. The attorney can educate the
child about the benefits or disadvantages of stating his or her views,
help the child develop his or her views, and assist the child in
articulating his or her reasons for the views.
Counsel can also inform the court that the child wants to be heard
249
when neither parent plans to call the child. Providing an attorney
or acquiescence defense is asserted; and (4) where evidence shows the child objects
to being returned).
245. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, at art. 11.
246. See Basil v. Ibis Aida De Teresa Sosa, No. 8:07-CV-918-T-27TGW, 2007 WL
2264599, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2007). In Basil, the petition was served on the
respondent on May 29, 2007. Id. The June 7, 2007 hearing was postponed until June
14, 2007 because petitioner had just retained counsel and needed time to respond to
the petition. Id. On June 14, the respondent asked for a continuance in order “to
further the evidentiary foundation” for the Article 13(b) defense, which was based
on spousal violence. Id. The court denied the motion and called the request for a
continuance “implicitly acknowledg[ing] that the evidence she presented does not
rise to the level of a grave risk.” Id. at *13 n.15.
247. See supra text accompanying note 11 (giving text of Article 13 “age and
maturity” defense). This defense, in whole or in part, was the basis for refusing to
return the child in thirteen percent of cases of judicial non-return in the United
States in 2002, up from zero cases in 1999. Compare Hague Conference on Private
International Law, October 30–November 9, 2006, A Statistical Analysis of Applications
Made in 2003 Under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction: National Reports, Prelim Doc. No. 3, Part II, at 645 (Oct.
2006),
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd_pd03efs2006.pdf
(reporting that thirteen percent of U.S. cases involving judicial refusal to return the
child were based on the child’s objection), with Hague Conference on Private
International Law, October 30–November 9, 2006, 1991 Statistical Analysis, Part II:
National Report United States, Prelim. Doc. No. 3, at 13 (2001), available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=2857 (reporting
that none of the ten U.S. cases of judicial non-return were based upon the child’s
objection to return).
248. ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, at 153 (VI.A.2.c).
249. See In re Marriage of Witherspoon, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586, 594–95 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (stating that thirteen and eleven-year-old children should be heard by the trial
court on remand even though neither party called them to express their
preferences); Bruch, supra note 36, at 534 n.20 (discussing Re J, a case involving a
mother who did not bring to the court’s attention her son’s fears about the father’s
alleged abuse because, the court opined, she feared being blamed for trying to
influence the child, and the older child’s views were only made known to the court
when the older child obtained his own counsel and appealed the decision ordering
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for the child guarantees that the child has the opportunity to express
his or her views, either directly or through the representative,
consistent with Article 12 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
250
Child. Having the opportunity to participate can be very important
to a child’s well-being. Joan Kelly, a clinical psychologist and
researcher, reports that children excluded from the divorce process
“complain about feeling isolated and lonely . . . and many older
251
youngsters express anger and frustration about being left out.” In
fact, “a huge body of research show[s] that for children . . . perceived
252
control is related to mental health,” including research from child
253
Research by Reunite, a U.K. charity
protection proceedings.
focused on international child abduction, indicates that these
254
findings are probably equally applicable to abduction proceedings.

return). As Baroness Hale of Richmond stated in one Hague Abduction Convention
case before the House of Lords:
[T]here is now a growing understanding of the importance of listening to
the children involved in children’s cases. It is the child, more than anyone
else, who will have to live with what the court decides. Those who do listen
to children understand that they often have a point of view which is quite
distinct from that of the person looking after them. They are quite capable
of being moral actors in their own right. Just as the adults may have to do
what the court decides whether they like it or not, so may the child. But that
is no more a reason for failing to hear what the child has to say than it is for
refusing to hear the parents’ views.
In re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 A.C.
619, 641 (H.L.)(appeal taken from Eng.)(U.K.).
250. Article 12 states:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the
age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity
to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the
child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in
a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 23. The United States is not
a party to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). However, our
Hague treaty partners are parties to the CRC. Therefore, the United States’s respect
for the CRC is important if the United States is to maintain an interpretation of the
Hague Convention that is uniform with our treaty partners.
251. Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for Parents and Children in
Custody and Access Disputes: Current Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 129,
149 (2002).
252. Melton, supra note 225, at 938.
253. See Atwood, supra note 238, at 145–46 (“Research shows that children [in
child protection proceedings] resent their exclusion from decision-making involving
their welfare and suffer low self-esteem and feelings of powerlessness when they are
not consulted or informed about actions taken that affect them.”).
254. See Marilyn Freeman & Anne-Marie Hutchinson, The Voice of the Child In
International Child Abduction, [2007] INT’L FAM. L. 177, 177 (reporting the findings
from International Child Abduction, The Effects (Reunite 2006), including that
“[c]hildren reported feeling a lack of faith as a result of having been failed by the

2008] INTOLERABLE SITUATIONS AND COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN

387

However, just as some children do not want the responsibility of
255
expressing their preferences during a custody adjudication, some
children undoubtedly feel similarly during a Hague proceeding. In
fact, making a choice can “create stress and compromise parent-child
256
relationships.” Counsel for the child can inform the court whether
the child wants to express his or her own thoughts and what the
boundaries are for any such testimony. For example, the child may
want to be heard, but may not want to express a preference for
staying or returning.
Lawyers are also very important for influencing courts’ receptivity
to children’s views. The Convention leaves the age at which a child
257
should be heard to the “discretion of the competent authorities.”
Case law demonstrates that the determination is highly
individualized, although courts have sometimes imposed a
258
When courts have discounted
categorical age requirement.
259
children’s views because of their age, either categorically
or
260
otherwise, the children often have lacked attorneys. Children
would benefit from having advocates argue that they are old enough
to have their voices heard.
After the attorney helps a child clear the age hurdle, the attorney
can argue that the child’s views should make a difference to the
outcome. Part of the argument is legal, as there are “conflicting
interpretations in U.S. courts” about the form an objection should
261
Part of the argument is factual, as some courts discount
take.

legal system and the adults involved” because children were not taken seriously and
“their views [were] not carrying much weight”).
255. Kelly, supra note 251, at 151 (“Children not only clearly understand the
difference between expressing their thoughts and making final decisions, but most
state that they do not want to make autonomous choices.”).
256. Id. at 151.
257. See Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, supra note 59, at 433, ¶ 30 (“[A]ll efforts to
agree on a minimum age at which the views of the child could be taken into account
failed, since all the ages suggested seemed artificial, even arbitrary. It seemed best to
leave the application of this clause to the discretion of the competent authorities.”).
258. See Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486, 490 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)
(holding that the defense “simply does not apply to a nine-year-old child”).
259. Id. (child was unrepresented).
260. See In re B Del. C.S.B., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1198 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007)
(ten-year-old child); Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548, 2007 WL
2344760 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2007) (thirteen-year-old child); Yang v. Tsui, No. 2:03cv-1613, 2006 WL 2466095, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2006) (ten-year-old child);
Escaf v. Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2002) (thirteen-year-old child).
261. Anastacia M. Greene, Seen and Not Heard? Children’s Objections Under the Hague
Convention on International Child Abduction, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 105, 137
(2005). For example, some courts require that the child’s objection be based on the
problems with the habitual residence, and not the benefits of the abducted-to state
or the problems with the left-behind parent.
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262

children’s views based on the child’s immaturity, or the abductor’s
263
264
The
influence, or a variety of weak or debatable reasons.
265
As one court noted, “[t]he
decisions are simply “idiosyncratic.”
results reached in published decisions seem to vary considerably,

262. See, e.g., England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 272–73 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding
thirteen-year-old child was not mature enough for the court to consider her view
under Article 13 because she had multiple foster care placements, Attention Deficit
Disorder, a Ritalin prescription, and learning disabilities); Hazbun Escaf v.
Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 615 (E.D. Va. 2002) (finding that thirteen-year-old
child was “not exceptionally mature”). There is no “set criteria for determining
‘maturity’” and courts have evaluated child’s maturity with and without expert
testimony. Greene, supra note 261, at 132.
263. Lieberman v. Tabachnik, No. 07-cv-02415-WYD, 2008 WL 1744353, at *15 (D.
Colo. Apr. 10, 2008) (refusing to honor child’s preference because of possibility that
child was influenced by respondent); In re B. Del C.S.B., 525 F. Supp. 2d at 1199
(discounting ten-year-old’s testimony because she used the word “harassed” and
“lovable” which suggested adult influence); Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp.
2d 603, 615 (E.D. Va. 2002) (refusing to honor thirteen-year-old child’s preference,
in part, because “some of [thirteen year old’s] statements regarding reasons for
staying in the United States appear to be the product of suggestion, echoing the
preferences of his father”); see also Department of State, Hague International Child
Abduction Convention: Text & Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,509 (1986)
(“A child’s objection to being returned may be accorded little if any weight if the
court believes that the child’s preference is the product of the abductor parent’s
undue influence over the child.”). But see Laguna v. Avila, No. 07-CV-5136 (ENV),
2008 WL 1986253, at *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2008) (granting defense when thirteenyear-old child exhibited, inter alia, “a perceptive understanding of the key issues
presented for trial” and stating, “the risk of undue influence . . . is no excuse for
judicial paralysis.
Such testimony should be taken, considered, and where
appropriate, can support an age and maturity defense.”) (citations omitted); Kofler
v. Kofler, Civil No. 07-5040, 2007 WL 2081712, at *9 (W.D. Ark. July 18, 2007)
(finding that children’s views were not unduly influenced by respondent, although it
was respondent’s impetus that led them to write letters to the court); Blondin v.
Dubois, 78 F. Supp. 2d 283, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (coaching by abductor was not
equivalent to “undue influence”).
264. See, e.g., Lopez v. Alcala, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1257–59 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
(discounting ten-year-old’s statement that he did not want to return “to Mexico
primarily out of concern for his mother”—after child testified to a court-appointed
child psychologist that he “recalled [the father] hitting and kicking their mother”—
because, inter alia, “[t]he well-being of his mother should not be a child’s concern”);
In re B. Del C.S.B., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (discounting ten-year-old’s views because
although the child “objects to being returned to a country she has not visited in five
years, and to a father she has not seen in five years,” she “cannot be expected to
weigh the immediate yet short-term effects of returning to Mexico against the
barriers she will face as she matures into adulthood as an illegal alien in the United
States”); Toiber v. Toiber, [2006] 208 O.A.C. 385, 393 (Ont. Ct. App.)(Can.) (calling
thirteen-year-old’s statement that she did not want to go back to Israel and that she
disliked her father no more “than those often expressed by a child caught in the
vortex of a custody battle”). Compare Toiber, supra, with LOWE, EVERALL & NICHOLS,
supra note 49, at 334 (discussing rulings where courts have held that the word
“objects” has its literal meaning and does not mean views more impassioned than in
a typical custody dispute).
265. See De Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Given the factintensive and idiosyncratic nature of the inquiry, decisions applying the age and
maturity exception are understandably disparate.”).

2008] INTOLERABLE SITUATIONS AND COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN

389

266

even among children in a similar age group.” Counsel for the child
can also address the policy concerns that sometimes lead courts to
reject the defense, even when they find children to be of age and
mature. While a number of courts have recognized that “a court may
refuse repatriation solely on the basis of a considered objection to
267
returning by a sufficiently mature child,” a number of other courts
have cautioned that honoring a child’s decision can undermine the
268
Convention.
Zealous advocacy for the child is essential in light of
all of the factors that courts consider when deciding whether to heed
or ignore a child’s voice. As the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children has posited: “Why would one object to giving the
child a voice in such an important decision? Certainly, it is difficult
269
to argue that the child should not have an advocate.”
Third, counsel may help alleviate the stress that the Hague
proceeding produces in the child. Counsel can advocate for
procedures that will mitigate the child’s discomfort. For example, it
may be important for a particular child not to speak with the judge
directly or to have a support person there when the conversation
occurs (i.e., his or her lawyer). Joan Kelly notes that “[f]rom a
clinical perspective, being interviewed in chambers is a formidable
and inherently stressful experience for most school-aged
270
youngsters.”
The Pérez-Vera Explanatory Report also recognizes
266. Man v. Cummings, No. CV 08-15-PA, 2008 WL 803005, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 21,
2008) (citations omitted).
267. See De Silva, 481 F.3d at 1286 (quoting Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 166
(2d Cir. 2001)) (honoring child’s preference); Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1037
(9th Cir. 2005) (remanding to district court for determination of whether children
objected to being returned and whether they were sufficiently mature for their views
to be considered); Di Giuseppe v. Di Giuseppe, No. 07-CV-15240, 2008 WL 1743079,
at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2008) (honoring children’s preferences); Leites v.
Mendiburu, No. 6:07-cv-2004-Orl-19DAB, 2008 WL 114954, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9,
2008) (honoring child’s preference).
268. See In re B Del. C.S.B., 525 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (noting that child’s testimony
was likely coached and that child did not grasp consequences of remaining an illegal
immigrant in the United States); Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV2548, 2007 WL 2344760, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2007) (noting that honoring
child’s preference may reward a parent for circumventing the Convention’s
structures); Yang v. Tsui, No. 2:03-cv-1613, 2006 WL 2466095, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Aug.
25, 2006) (noting that child’s wish not to return to her habitual residence was a
result of being wrongfully retained for more than three years and honoring the
child’s wish would undermine the Convention and “reward the malfeasant parent”);
see also JPC v. SLW, SMW, [2007] 2 FLR 900, ¶¶ 48–49 (Eng.).
269. LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES, supra note 218, at 71.
NCMEC suggests some reasons why the attorney for the petitioner might oppose
appointment of a guardian ad litem, but the reasons all relate to the possibility of
expanding the proceeding into a merits proceeding. Id. This would not occur if the
court focused on the Hague Abduction Convention and restricted evidence to the
issues and defenses permitted by the Convention.
270. Kelly, supra note 251, at 154.
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271

this fact. A major reason some courts appoint a guardian ad litem is
272
On the other hand, some
to avoid requiring the child to testify.
children may find it important to talk to the judge directly.
Determining which is true for a particular child can be important to
the child’s well-being. Counsel can also reduce a child’s stress by
informing the child about the proceedings and answering his or her
legal questions. Finally, counsel for the child may be able to remind
the court of other concerns the child has related to the proceedings.
The child may have his or her own need to resolve the matter
expeditiously, perhaps to begin the school year in a particular place,
or to delay the execution of an order, perhaps until the school year is
completed.
Fourth, counsel can help secure the child’s well-being during the
pendency of the proceedings. As the ABA states, “[t]he purpose of
child representation is not only to advocate a particular outcome, but
also to protect children from collateral damage from litigation.
While the case is pending, conditions that deny the children a
minimum level of security and stability may need to be remedied or
273
prevented.”
For example, the court may need to increase the
child’s contact with the left-behind parent, or impose conditions to
prevent the reabduction of the child by either parent.
Fifth, the child’s representative may facilitate settlement between
the parents. By emphasizing the child’s interests and proposing
solutions that go beyond the zero-sum position of the parents, the
child’s representative may help the parents find a middle ground.
Sixth, and finally, appointing a representative for the child will
enhance the likelihood that the child will follow the order. There
may exist barriers to the child’s cooperation, such as the timing of
the return, and the child’s representative can make these issues
known to the court. Additionally, the child’s representative can
271. See Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, supra note 59, at 433, ¶ 30 (stating that “this
provision [the age and maturity defense] could prove dangerous if it were applied by
means of the direct questioning of young people who may admittedly have a clear
grasp of the situation but who may also suffer serious psychological harm if they
think they are being forced to choose between two parents”).
272. See Wittman v. Wittman, No. FA074006469S, 2007 WL 826536, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2007) (appointing guardian ad litem to avoid forcing a ten-yearold and seven-year-old to testify for either parent). Obtaining the child’s testimony
out of court may also facilitate its usefulness. Kelly notes that “judges are not trained
in child interviewing skills, and generally lack knowledge about developmental
differences in cognitive, language, and emotional capacities. Thus, it is hard for
even the most experienced judge to place children’s responses in an appropriate
context and evaluate the weight that should be given to their wishes.” Kelly, supra
note 251, at 154 (citation omitted).
273. ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, at 154 (VI.A.2 Commentary).
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monitor whether the order’s execution is unnecessarily harmful to
the child. As Professor Bucher suggests, the child should not be
denied contact with the abductor if authorities could supervise their
274
Nor should authorities enforcing the order
continued contact.
“inflict upon the child suffering that seriously endangers his or her
275
Professor Bucher gives the following
physical and mental state.”
examples:
the use of physical force on the child (physical violence, other
corporal punishment, detention, use of drugs that impair
consciousness and willpower), refusing to let the child say goodbye
to the [abductor], the child not being taken charge of and
accompanied by personnel trained in child psychology in order to
take care of the child in such extreme and difficult
276
circumstances.

If the child resists the return order, the judge can best address the
situation, which might require enforcing its order against the child, if
the child has counsel. Children subject to a return order sometimes
277
278
refuse to board planes or threaten suicide. If a child’s opposition
causes a ruckus, the pilot might not let the child board. If the child
was not a participant in the Hague proceeding, at least through
279
representation, the child’s due process rights arguably preclude the
court from enforcing its order against the child directly.

274. Bucher, supra note 2, at 152.
275. Id. at 153. Professor Bucher, in discussing the Swiss Act, suggests that the
Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” defense should be used to assess enforcement
measures. Id.
276. Id. The Swiss Act addresses the enforcement of return orders. It requires a
court to consider whether its decision can be executed, see Swiss Federal Act, art.
10(2), and requires a court to give specific instructions for the execution of a return
order. Id. art. 11(1). Those executing the order must “take account of the best
interests of the child and endeavour to obtain the voluntary execution of the
decision.” Id. art. 12(2). The court also has the ability to stop the execution of its
order. Id. art. 13.
277. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 61, at 152 (discussing a case in which a
child had twice refused to board a plane).
278. See Garcia v. Angarita, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1373, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
(reporting that a week after the filing of the petition, an eleven-year-old threatened
suicide if forced to return). The court, however, found that the parent had not met
the burden of “clear and convincing evidence that the risk [was] sufficiently grave to
warrant a denial of return[,]” given the doctor’s report that the child had no real
intention of harming himself. Id. Further, the court stated that the abducting
parent must not be “permitted to thwart a return by causing, or refusing to
ameliorate, psychological harm to the child” by not returning with child. Id. at 1382–
83.
279. See State ex rel. Partlow v. Law, 692 P.2d 863, 865 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that trial court had jurisdiction in paternity and child support action under
Uniform Parentage Act when child had a guardian ad litem who was an attorney and
participated in proceedings, although child was not made party to the action).
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At the point of resistance, the child’s counsel could seek a
modification of the order, if necessary, especially if enough time has
passed that a modification would be appropriate for that reason
280
alone. In In re F (Hague Convention: Child’s Objections), the order was
not executed for approximately eighteen months, due in part to the
child’s refusal to board the plane. The mother successfully asked the
court to set aside the original orders based on the child’s
281
objections. Not all abductors will act like the mother in In re F and
seek modification, especially if the abductor has been ordered to pay
282
the left-behind parent’s attorney’s fees and fears being penalized
283
for the child’s resistance. However, the child’s representative could
ask the court to reexamine the order if execution becomes a grave
risk to the child’s physical or psychological well-being or otherwise
places the child in an intolerable situation.
Two facts make all of the reasons cited above for appointing a
representative even more compelling. First, many Hague cases are
adjudicated in federal court, where judges often have little
experience with cases that so profoundly affect children’s well-being.
Second, no matter whether the case is heard in state or federal court,
the judge is unlikely to have adjudicated a Hague Convention case
before. The novelty of these cases means that the judicial process
and decision-making would benefit from a lawyer advocating for the
child. The judge would certainly sleep better at night knowing that
his or her decision, which may profoundly impact a child’s safety and
well-being, was based on the best evidence and argument. As
Baroness Hale of Richmond, of the English House of Lords, stated in
In re D (A Child) (Abduction Rights of Custody): “[W]henever it seems
likely that the child’s views and interests may not be properly
presented to the court, and in particular where there are legal
arguments which the adult parties are not putting forward, then the
284
child should be separately represented.”
B. An Example: Mendez-Lynch v. Pizzutello
The previous section discussed the reasons why courts should
appoint representatives for children in Hague Abduction Convention
280. (2006) FamCA 685 ¶¶ 25, 26, 82 (Austl.); see also In re HB (Abduction:
Children’s Objections) (No. 2), [1998] 1 FLR 564 (Hale, J.) (Eng.).
281. In re F, at ¶¶ 25, 26, 82. The federal police used some physical force to try to
get the child to board. Id. ¶ 26.
282. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11607 (2006).
283. See supra note 249 (discussion of Re J).
284. In re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1
A.C. 619, 642 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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proceedings. The importance of doing so becomes even more
obvious when one analyzes particular cases. For example, the Mendez285
Lynch v. Pizzutello decision in 2008 demonstrates the advantage of
the Swiss approach.
The Mendez-Lynch children were abducted twice; both abductions
286
The first proceeding occurred when the
resulted in litigation.
287
children were nine and six years old.
At that time, the mother
raised an Article 13(b) defense, alleging that she and the children’s
288
father had many physical confrontations. The mother said that he
“slammed a door into her, held her down, spit on her, placed his
hands around her neck, pushed and ‘smacked’ her, and threw things
289
290
at her.” The father denied any physical contact. The court never
resolved the conflicting testimony, but concluded that the
respondent had not met her burden of showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the “grave risk of harm” defense was made
291
out because there had been no direct abuse of the children.
The
court said, “[t]he assessment focuses upon the children, and it does
not matter if the Respondent is the better parent in the long run, had
good reason to leave her home in Argentina and terminate her
marriage, or whether she will suffer if the children are returned to
292
Argentina.”
The court also considered whether it should deny return because
nine-year-old Dylan gave “uncontradicted” testimony that he “wants
293
to stay in the United States and does not want to go to Argentina.”
The parties stipulated that six-year-old Brandon had “not attained an
age or degree of maturity to make it appropriate to take his views into
294
account.” The court felt that Dylan had attained the requisite age
295
and degree of maturity, but exercised its discretion and ordered
296
It noted that his memories of
Dylan to return nevertheless.
Argentina were those of a six-year-old, since he had been in the
exclusive custody of his mother and away from Argentina since the
abduction, and that his mother’s views had probably influenced his

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 WL 416934 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 13, 2008).
Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934, at *1.
Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1350 (M.D. Fl. 2002).
Id. at 1350.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1361–62.
Id. at 1362.
Id.
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297

The court concluded that the “return of Dylan . . .
own views.
would further the aims of the Hague Convention,” and ordered his
298
return despite his contrary wishes.
In the second Hague abduction proceeding involving these
children, many years later, the court again rejected a “grave risk of
299
The mother
harm” defense and ignored both children’s views.
alleged that after she and the children returned to Argentina
following the first abduction hearing, the petitioner verbally abused
300
These allegations, which
her and physically abused the children.
the mother claims were supported by affidavits signed by the minor
301
children, led the Argentinean court to award temporary custody to
302
In 2005, the
the mother and to suspend the father’s visitation.
mother and children traveled to the United States with the
permission of the Argentinean courts, but did not return when
303
The father again brought a Hague petition for
ordered to do so.
304
the children’s return.
When the Hague petition was heard in 2008, the children were
305
The respondent’s trial
fourteen and twelve years old.
memorandum stated that the children “have expressed the desire to
remain here in school, with their church, friends and extended
306
family.” During the hearing, the judge spoke with the children in
307
his chambers for ten minutes.
After the meeting, the court
expressed “concern about what might befall the children during any
308
efforts they might undertake to avoid being returned to Argentina.”
309
Nonetheless, the court ordered the children’s return. As for the
alleged abuse, the court held that the respondent had failed to make

297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See Mendez-Lynch v. Pizzutello, No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 WL 416934, at
*4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2008) (stating the rights of the father overrode the desires of
the children).
300. Brief of Respondent at *2, Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934.
301. Id. at *5.
302. Id. at *1–2. The mother indicates that there were two police reports that
discuss the beatings of one of the children, although the date and content of those
reports is unclear. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (May 12,
2008) (on file with author). The father has not been contacted so it is unknown
whether he would verify or refute the mother’s assertions.
303. See Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934, at *1.
304. Id. at *2.
305. Brief of Respondent at *5, Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934.
306. Id.
307. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (Aug. 11, 2008) (on file
with author).
308. Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934, at *3.
309. Id. at 4.
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310

out the Article 13(b) defense. Regarding the children’s wishes, the
court noted that, “[b]oth children adamantly stated their opposition
to returning to Argentina. They like the Gilmer County community
311
and the schools they are attending.” The court “recognize[d]” that
“being uprooted from this community is distressing to the
312
The court then said, “[w]hile the Court is sympathetic
children.”
with their feelings, the Court finds that their desires do not override
313
their father’s rights.”
Regarding the children’s threats to take
certain action if they were forced to return, the court was unmoved.
The court refused to allow the process “to be manipulated by the
314
threats of affected children.”
Nonetheless, the judge’s order
contained a footnote that suggests he found the children’s testimony
troubling:
[I]n light of the concerns raised by the children in their interviews
with the Court, the Court urges the parties to allow the children to
remain in the actual physical custody of Respondent upon the
return to Argentina until the proper court in Argentina can
315
address this issue.

The court’s footnote meant nothing to the eventual outcome,
however. The children were returned to Argentina and placed with
their father. The children’s mother was unable to return to
Argentina with them because her passport was not current and she
316
feared criminal prosecution for child abduction.
According to the mother, who eventually traveled to Argentina, the
children have not fared well upon their return to Argentina. The
mother reports that the U.S. Embassy in Argentina tried to follow up
with the children, but the father would not permit it without a court
317
order. Then, an Argentinean court, apparently without seeing the
318
children, gave custody to the father and entered an injunction
310. See id. (noting respondent failed to provide the requisite level of proof of
“physical and emotional abuse”).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at *3. The nature of the danger is undisclosed.
315. Id. at *4 n.6.
316. There was no requirement imposed by the court that criminal charges
against her in Argentina be dropped, as had been done in the first case, so that she
could in fact return with the children. Compare Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220
F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1366 (M.D. Fl. 2002) (criminal charges ordered dropped), with
Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934, at *4 (no order to drop criminal charges). The latter
opinion does not reflect whether her counsel made such a request.
317. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (Apr. 4, 2008) (on file
with author).
318. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (May 14, 2008) (on file
with author).
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against the mother forbidding her from seeing them. The children
claim that their life with their father has been unbearable. The
children’s allegations against their father are detailed in a newspaper
article written by an Argentinean reporter who has examined the
320
The mother also provided me with a letter Dylan
court files.
apparently wrote months after his return to Argentina to Judge Story,
321
the U.S. district court judge who entered the return order.
Judge
Story refuses to confirm or deny the existence of the letter, and it is
not contained in the court file. Assuming the letter is legitimate, it
also paints a horrific picture of the children’s situation and clearly
322
asks the judge for help. Subsequently, after many months of living
with their father, an Argentinean court finally placed the children
323
with a temporary guardian. At the time of publication, the fate of
the children is unclear.
What is clear is that the children were not represented at either the
first or second Hague proceeding in the United States. “[T]he Court
endeavored to make guardians-ad-litem available for the children
324
during [the 2008] proceeding,” but the children never received a
325
guardian because the parties could not agree on an individual. The
court could have, and should have, appointed a representative for the
children when the parties could not agree on a specific person.

319. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (May 12, 2008) (on file
with author). In other cases, a custody proceeding may never occur in the child’s
habitual residence after return, especially if legal aid is not available for the
abducting parent. See Freeman & Hutchinson, supra note 254, at 179.
320. Guillermo Háskel, U.S. Mother Fights for Sons’ Custody, BUENOS AIRES HERALD,
Nov. 15, 2008, at 2.
The files are also full with [the boys’] allegations that their father beats them
and kicks them, threatens to burn their faces in the stove, frightens them
with reckless driving changing lanes and telling them “you want to commit
suicide,” prevents them from seeing their mother, walks naked around the
house urging the children to do the same, shows them porno magazines,
leaves them locked and in-communicated when going away, and sleeps with
a machete and a rifle besides [sic] his bed.
Id. According to the article, “Teófilo Méndez Lynch has only admitted to some
disciplinary spanking of his sons.” Id.
321. Letter from Dylan Mendez-Lynch to Judge Story (undated) (on file with
author).
322. Letter from Dylan Mendez-Lynch to Judge Story (undated) (on file with
author).
323. E-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle H. Weiner (Sept. 9, 2008) (on file
with author). The judge stated, “I am obliged to adopt some measures…to stop
violence against Brandon and Dylan. That is a crime against the minors.” Háskel,
supra note 320.
324. Mendez-Lynch v. Pizzutello, No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 WL 416934, at *3
n.4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2008).
325. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (Aug. 11, 2008) (on file
with author).
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A representative for Dylan and Brandon might have made a
difference in so many ways. For example, the attorney could have
zealously advocated during the proceedings for their voices to be
heard, and for an assurance of their safety and well-being if they were
to be returned. The attorney could have built a better case for the
children given the facts underlying the alleged abuse. The attorney
could have argued vigorously that considerable weight should be
given to their views. After all, the sole rationale given by the court for
disregarding the children’s views—that their views did not outweigh
326
their father’s rights —was an error. Such reasoning would always
defeat the defense. The attorney also could have argued against the
ridiculous position articulated in the petitioner’s post trial brief:
“Allowing threats made by the children of self-inflicted bodily harm,
if they are returned to Argentina, as the motivating factor for denying
the return would open the floodgates in future Hague Convention
327
An attorney focused on the children
cases to suicide threats.”
undoubtedly would have explored whether the mother could in fact
return with them to Argentina and would have suggested an
appropriate placement for them until the Argentine courts could
evaluate the allegations of abuse. The attorney for the children could
have asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for a
stay when the district court rejected the mother’s request, pointing
out that once the children were returned the appeal was moot in the
328
If the children had an attorney, the letter
Eleventh Circuit.
apparently written by Dylan to Judge Story could have been
329
appended to a Rule 60 Motion or used as the basis for other
advocacy on the children’s behalf. An attorney for the children
could have served as another resource to help ensure that the
appropriate Argentinean authorities addressed the children’s
326. See Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934, at *4.
327. Post Trial Brief at 1–2, Mendez-Lynch, No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 WL
416934. The argument is ridiculous because it makes all such threats irrelevant, no
matter how likely it is that the threat will be carried out. The children’s attorney
could have also rebutted the petitioner’s assertion that the children’s “‘maturity’
should not be relied upon given the inherent instability in the Respondent’s ability
to provide a stable environment for the children.” Trial Brief Supporting
Petitioner’s Request for Removal at 22, Mendez-Lynch, No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008
WL 416934.
328. Courts differ on whether the children’s return renders an appeal moot.
Compare, e.g., Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2004) (case not moot),
and Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 497 (4th Cir. 2003) (case not moot), with
Bekier v. Bekier, 248 F.3d 1051, 1054 (11th Cir. 2001) (case moot). For all practical
purposes, however, even if the litigation is not moot, the litigation is often over if a
stay is not granted because the abductor’s attention is redirected towards
proceedings in the child’s habitual residence.
329. FED. R. CIV. P. 60.
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situation expeditiously and that the U.S. authorities were doing
everything possible to protect these children.
C. Are There Reasons Not to Appoint Counsel for Children?
Some scholars claim that courts should not appoint attorneys for
children because such appointments can change the nature of the
330
For example, Professor Linda Silberman has called
proceedings.
“expert testimony,” “independent representation,” and even
consideration of the child’s views “trappings” that “should not be
331
imposed on a Hague proceeding because it is not a custody case.”
Similarly, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
has suggested that a guardian ad litem will investigate concerns that
332
Whether for these
really go to the merits of the custody issue.
reasons or others, only a handful of the signatories to the Hague
Convention appear to appoint counsel for children in Hague
333
Convention proceedings.
A Hague proceeding is not designed to adjudicate the merits of
custody. That said, children’s views are relevant to many of the issues
that are explicitly part of a Hague Convention proceeding. In
addition, as discussed above, counsel for the child serves various
functions apart from bringing forth evidence and argument.
Nonetheless, courts may be reluctant to appoint representation for

330. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 61, at 187 (citing increased
complications and a threat to the summary nature of the proceedings).
331. Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Abduction Convention Turns Twenty: Gender
Politics and Other Issues, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 244 (2000).
332. LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES, supra note 219, at 71.
333. Answers to a questionnaire disseminated in anticipation of the last Special
Session appeared to suggest that courts in only the following countries had the
discretion to appoint counsel for children, and the frequency of such appointments
was either not indicated or varied widely: Argentina; Canada; New Zealand; Panama;
South Africa; United Kingdom (Scotland); England/Wales; United States. See
Collated Responses, supra note 88, at Question #9. Yet, admittedly, not all countries
answered the question. In addition, a country may, in fact, make counsel for
children an option even if it was not mentioned in the answer because the question
was open-ended. Id. In fact, research by others suggests that the answers to the
questionnaire did not capture all countries that provide counsel for children in
Hague cases. See, e.g., Schuz, supra note 223, at 432 n.175 (mentioning New Zealand
“appoints a separate representative whenever the grave harm or child objection risk
is raised, and France, which appoints a children’s lawyer whenever the children are
old enough to have their wishes taken into account”). But see id. at 432 (“It seems
that most courts have adopted an extremely narrow approach to ordering separate
representation.”); id. at 432–33 (mentioning one case in Israel and a few cases in
England); see also William J. Keough, The Separate Representation of Children in
Australian Family Law—Effective Practice or Mere Rhetoric?, 19 CAN. J. FAM. L. 371, 403–04
(2002) (explaining that the Family Law Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) states that there
must be “exceptional circumstances” to justify the appointment of an attorney in
Hague Convention cases).
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the child if more evidence and argument will come before the court;
Hague proceedings are meant to be expeditious. However, it helps
no one (and it can affirmatively hurt a child) for a court to make a
wrong decision quickly. As the High Court of Australia once said
when determining that it was appropriate for children to have a
representative, “[p]rompt listing for hearing is one thing; an over334
If courts focus the
hasty and insufficient hearing is another.”
parties and their counsel on what is relevant under the Convention
and exclude evidence that only goes to the merits of custody, then
delay should not occur. In fact, the Australian court concluded,
“[t]he presence of separate representation should not hinder, and
indeed should assist, the prompt disposition of Convention
335
In short, fear that counsel may try to introduce
applications.”
irrelevant evidence should not stop the appointment of counsel since
counsel facilitate the consideration of relevant evidence, do so in an
efficient manner, and help achieve other important goals.
Undeniably, representation for children increases the costs of
336
337
these proceedings. The costs must either be born by the parties
334. See De L v. Director-General (1996) 187 C.L.R. 640, 660 (Austl.).
335. Id.; see also Schuz, supra note 223, at 431 (“There is no good reason why
appointing an independent representative for the child should necessarily delay the
proceedings.”).
336. The AAML mentions that “representatives for children may delay the
proceedings and tax the resources both of the parties and the courts.” Representing
Children: Standards for Attorneys, supra note 222, at 3, § 1 cmt.
337. A court can allocate the cost of the representation, as appropriate, pursuant
to the cost provision in the International Child Abduction Remedies Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 11607(b) (2006) (awarding costs to a prevailing petitioner unless “clearly
inappropriate”); see also Kufner v. Kufner, No. 07-46S, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37435,
at *8–10 (D. R.I. May 23, 2007) (ordering respondent to reimburse petitioner’s fees,
including $13,340 for the court-appointed representative for the child); cf. Gaddis v.
United States, 381 F.3d 444, 454–55 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding express statutory
authority in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, as required by Crawford Fitting, to
provide district courts with the power and discretion to tax guardian ad litem fees as
costs). The court might find such an award “clearly inappropriate,” however, if the
respondent is indigent. See Berendsen v. Nichols, 938 F. Supp. 737, 738–39 (D. Kan.
1996) (reducing award under 42 U.S.C. § 11607 because of respondent’s financial
condition and need to support his children). An interesting question, which goes
beyond the scope of this Article, is whether the petitioner could be taxed the costs of
the guardian ad litem when the respondent is the prevailing party. This is suggested
by ICARA, International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611
(2006), which indicates that costs are generally to be born by the petitioner, unless
the petitioner prevails and the cost-shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3)
applies. 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(1),(2) (2006). This would also be consistent with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), which embodies a presumption that costs
should be awarded to the prevailing party unless such an award is “unjust,” although
that rule has arguably been supplanted by the provision on costs in ICARA. Id.; FED.
R. CIV. P. 54(d). For a list of state statutory and case law authorities for the provision
of compensation to attorneys and guardians ad litem that represent children, see
REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE: 250 JURISDICTIONS IN 2005: HOW CHILDREN’S
VOICES ARE HEARD IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS, U.S. COMPENSATION SCHEME
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338

However, the cost of the
or the public if the parties are indigent.
representation is a negligible consideration when the parents agree
to the representation and bearing its costs. It seems highly likely that
parents will consent to representation for the child when asked by the
court to do so (especially when the court emphasizes its importance
for the child and the court’s inclination to appoint a representative
regardless of the parties’ consent).
Nonetheless, the cost of
representation becomes a real consideration when it is imposed on
an unwilling parent or the public at large.
The cost of representation becomes less of an obstacle to an
appointment, however, if parents have a moral obligation to pay for
their child’s representation. There are many lenses through which
one might examine the parents’ moral obligations, and Professor
Loken, in his article Gratitude and the Map of Moral Duties Toward
339
Children, thoroughly canvases them all. While it is beyond the scope
of this Article to make the argument that parents have a moral duty
to pay for a representative under one or more of the various theories,
it appears that such an argument can be made. The moral obligation
of the parent arguably arises if one is a consequentialist and seeking
the best outcomes, or a Kantian bound by the categorical imperatives
(including that human beings are ends and not means), or a
contractarian like Rawls, who emphasizes the social contract
established by those behind a veil of ignorance. Loken’s own theory
for imposing moral obligations—gratitude—also supports a parental
340
obligation to pay for the child’s representation. Children who are
in the midst of an abduction dispute have experienced and dealt with
hardship, whether from the underlying parental dispute, the
abduction, or the proceedings. The child is therefore owed “a debt
that ought to be consistently acknowledged and, when later
341
The
circumstances permit, repaid by appropriate beneficence.”
parents would satisfy their debt, at least partially, by providing their
child with a representative to guard his or her interests during the
proceedings. As Judge Wall stated in Re S, “[t]hat [expense]
factor . . . is outweighed by the critical importance of this issue to the
CHART (Jean Koh Peters, Supervisor 2006), http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/
summary.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2008).
338. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3153(b) (West 2004) (“[T]he portion of the cost of
that counsel which the court finds the parties are unable to pay shall be paid by the
county.”).
339. See generally Gregory A. Loken, Gratitude and the Map of Moral Duties Toward
Children, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1121 (1999).
340. See generally id.
341. Id. at 1185 (giving as an example a child living in a house with a severely
impaired sibling).
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children and for the need for their fully independent voice to be
342
343
heard in the proceedings.” Others concur.
Assuming parents are morally obligated to provide their children
with counsel in Hague proceedings, then the government should step
in when they are unable to pay, if for no other reason than to assure
children’s equal access to justice in Hague proceedings. The
government, in its parens patriae role, arguably also has an obligation
to shoulder the expense when the parents cannot, since
344
representation is potentially necessary to avoid harm to the child.
Similarly, representation is important despite its cost if a court takes
seriously the rights of children as set forth in the U.N. Convention on
345
For example, the South African
the Rights of the Child.
Constitution, which is heavily influenced by international human
rights instruments including the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, protects the child’s right to legal representation at state
346
expense.
A more difficult issue from the court’s perspective is what type of
counsel to appoint for a child in a Hague proceeding. The court
must decide whether to appoint a guardian ad litem, an attorney for
the child’s expressed interest, or both. Sometimes a statute will
resolve this question, but it may not. There are advocates for the
347
various positions,
although there seems to be an emerging
342. Re S (Abduction: Children: Separate Representation), [1997] 1 FLR 486,
495 (Eng.) (finding potential for conflict between the mother’s views and the
children’s views and interests).
343. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children: The Ongoing Search for Clear
and Workable Standards, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 183, 205 (2005)
(recognizing the additional costs to parents if children have counsel, but saying “in
some circumstances the cost may be justified by the benefit to the child and the court
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the child, some advocates recommend a “child-focused assessment of
352
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CONCLUSION
Parties to a multilateral convention can learn from their treaty
partners about ways to implement the convention better. Courts in
the United States would be well served to consider the Swiss
legislation that seeks to improve the application of the Hague
Abduction Convention by defining “intolerable situations” and
requiring the appointment of counsel for children. The U.S.
Executive Branch is itself unlikely to seek an amendment to the U.S.
implementing legislation to incorporate these types of changes, or
356
any changes for that matter.
Consequently, courts in the United
States must take the initiative to follow Switzerland’s approach,
assuming the Swiss reforms are worthy of emulation. For the reasons
expressed in this Article, I believe the Swiss reforms are very
beneficial and hopefully judges adjudicating these cases in the
United States will agree.
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either [a guardian ad litem or counsel for the child] depends upon that person’s
knowledge of the impact of domestic violence on children and his or her familiarity
with available services.”).
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(2006). The State Department is reluctant to amend ICARA for any reason because
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